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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Standard of review for the 16 issues relating to the summary judgment. 
In Issue I through Issue V the landowners are asking this court to make nine 
conclusions of law on points erroneously decided in the summary judgment. In Issue VI 
through Issue XII the landowners are asking this court to find that summary judgment was 
inappropriate on seven issues because they are "fact-bound" questions that should be 
decided by the jury. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, no deference is accorded 
to the trial court's conclusions of law and they are reviewed for correctness. Drysdale v. 
Ford Motor Co, 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Summary judgment is proper only when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the lower court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom 
are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party. Dwiggins v. Morgan 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). The factual submissions to the trial court are 
viewed in a light most favorable to finding a material issue of fact exists. Versluis v. 
Guaranty Nafl Cos, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). 
A. Erroneous conclusions of law. 
ISSUE I: In light of First English Evangelical's holding that "temporary 
takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property are no different in kind 
from permanent takings, for which the constitution clearly requires 
compensation,"did the trial court err when it found "as a matter of law that a land-
use regulation that is by its terms temporary, meaning finite in duration, is not a 
taking"? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 469 and 1585 of the record. 
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ISSUE II: Is it a physical taking when a county enters on private land with 
heavy equipment and drills and installs permanent monitoring wells, all without the 
consent of the landowner? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 1609-1607 
and 1580 of the record. 
ISSUE III: Did the trial court err when it dismissed the landowners' claim that 
the "series of rolling moratoria" were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal? This issue 
was preserved in the trial court at pages 484-478 of the record. 
SUBISSUE III A: When § 17-27-404(2) stated that a county commission "shall 
establish a period of limited effect for the temporary ordinances not to exceed 
six months," can the county impose "a series of rolling moratoria" that exceed 
six months? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 484 and 466 of the 
record. 
SUBISSUE III B: When § 17-27-404(l)(c) says that a moratorium ' may not 
impose . . . [a] financial requirement on building or development," can the 
county pass a "series of rolling moratoria" that prohibit all buildin g unless the 
landowners spend almost $50,000 on testing? This issue was preserved in the 
trial court at pages 483 and 1966 of the record. 
SUBISSUE III C: In light of Call which held that ordinances adopted without 
public notice are void ab initio, can the county adopt a moratorium ordinance 
without giving any notice that it will be acting on such an ordinance at a public 
meeting? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 483 and 1966 of the 
record. 
SUBISSUE III D: When § 17-27-403(l)(b) stated that a county commission 
"may not make any amendment" to the land use code without first submitting 
the amendment "to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or 
recommendations," could a county pass a moratorium ordinance that had not 
been submitted first to the planning commission? In other words, unlike all 
other land use ordinances in Utah, could a moratorium land use ordinance be 
passed without first being submitted to the planning commission? This issue 
was preserved in the trial court at pages 482 and 1592 of the record. 
ISSUE IV: When § 26A-1-121(1)( c) stated that the health department "shall 
provide public hearings prior to the adoption of any regulation or standard," can a 
county adopt numerous regulations on septic field installation without holding public 
hearings? A related subissue is did the trial court err in applying res judicata to one 
of the health board issues? The determination of whether res judicata bars am action is a 
question of law that is reviewed with no deference to the court below, but is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Christensen. 866 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah 1993). This issue was 
2 
preserved in the trial court at pages 498-492 and 1977-1975 of the record. 
ISSUE V: In light of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the 
"right of the people . . . to petition the government for redress," can the county cut 
off a citizen's right to speak with elected and appointed officials simply because that 
citizen files suit against the county? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 
451-448 and 1576-1574 of the record. 
B. Issues where summary judgment was inappropriate because the issues are 
"fact-bound" questions that should be decided by the jury. 
ISSUE VI: In light of Monterey, which held that "it was proper to submit this 
narrow, fact-bound question to the jury," was summary judgment appropriate where 
landowners raised questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the moratoria 
"substantially advance[d] a legitimate state interest"? The subissue is whether the 
federal standard of a "legitimate state interest" is heightened by § 17-27-404 which 
requires a "compelling, countervailing public interest," This issue was preserved in 
the trial court at pages 466-464 and 1959 of the record. 
ISSUE VII: Was summary judgment appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether the county had ulterior motives, bad faith, or 
malice in adopting a "series of rolling moratoria" that prohibited building for 2 Vi 
years? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 459 and 1950 of the record. 
ISSUE VIII: Was summary judgment appropriate on the fact intensive 
determination of whether the "series of rolling moratoria" were justified on the 
theory of nuisance? This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 1594-1591 and 
1950 of the record. 
ISSUE IX: Was summary judgment appropriate on the fact intensive 
determination of whether the "series of rolling moratoria" deprived the landowners 
of all economically beneficial use of their property? This issue was preserved in the 
trial court at pages 466 and 1968-1965 of the record. 
ISSUE X: Was summary judgment appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county violated the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses and § 1983? This issue was preserved in the trial court at 
pages 448, 1572, and 1582 of the record. 
ISSUE XI: Was summary judgment appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county was barred by the doctrine 
of zoning estoppel from enforcing the rolling moratoria? This issue was preserved in 
the trial court at pages 2899-98 of the record. 
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ISSUE XII: Was summary judgment appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity? The issue of qualified immunity turns on the objective legal 
reasonableness of the action. Ambus v. State Bd. Of Education, 858 P.2d 1372, 1378 
(Utah 1993). This issue was preserved in the trial court at page 459 of the record. 
II. Standard of Review for the abuse of discretion issues. 
In Issue XIII through Issue XV the landowners are asking the court to find the trial 
court abused its discretion on three issues. 
ISSUE XIII: Did the trial court err in compelling lay parties to respond to 
written interrogatories asking the lay parties to "specifically identify the clearly 
established law" violated by the county, especially since the parties identified the laws 
violated after objecting that it called for a legal opinion? Motions for protective orders 
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 78 
P.3d 603 (Utah 2003). This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 2586-2579 of 
the record. 
ISSUE XIV: Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs that were 
designated in the complaint as "John Does" but who were specifically identified in 
discovery responses to the county by name and by the lot they owned in the 
subdivision? The landowners can find no specific Utah case identifying the standard for 
reviewing when "John Doe" plaintiffs must be identified. This issue was preserved in the 
trial court at pages 2775-2766 of the record. 
ISSUE XV: In light of the "stringent" standard that attorney's fees should 
only rarely be awarded to defendants and when the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is 
frivolous, did the trial court err in granting the county's motion for attorney's fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988? A court's award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion if its fee award is 
based on an inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Ihler v. 
Chisholm. 995 P.2d 439 (Mont, 2000), Jane L. v. Bangerter. 61 F.3d 1505 (10th 
Cir.1995). This issue was preserved in the trial court at pages 2618-1613 of the record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
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First Amendment of the United States Constitution, "Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances." 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation." 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." 
U.C.A. § 17-27-402 
U.C.A. § 17-27-403 
U.C.A. § 17-27-404 
U.C.A. § 52-4-5(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case. 
In January of 1997 Wasatch County adopted ordinance 97-1 that imposed a 
moratorium prohibiting building in the area of the Canyon Meadows subdivision in Provo 
Canyon. This original moratorium included surrounding properties down to the Provo 
River. In the summer and fall of 1997, Wasatch County extended the moratorium 
indefinitely and applied it only to the Canyon Meadows subdivision, excluding the 
surrounding areas. The county presented the pretext of concern over slope stability and 
feasibility of individual septic systems as the reason for imposing this series of rolling 
moratoria, but in reality the county's actions were based on personal animus and malice 
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towards the homeowners association and its representatives. The homeowners filed a 
complaint seeking damages for regulatory takings, equal protection and due process 
violations, and for punitive damages against the county officials. The homeowners also 
sought relief seeking to prohibit the county from continuing to use and implement 
practices that violated the landowners' constitutional rights. 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
The original complaint in this matter was filed in September 10, 1997, in the Fourth 
District Court in Wasatch County. On October 10, 1997, Wasatch County removed the 
case to federal court based on the federal constitutional claims. After litigating the matter 
in federal court, Wasatch County filed a motion to dismiss arguing the taking claim was 
not ripe because the state courts had not denied compensation. The case was again filed in 
Wasatch County. The parties then stipulated to change venue to Utah County and the 
matter was filed in Provo. At the end of 1999 the landowners sought and received leave 
to amend the complaint. 
At the beginning of 2001, both parties filed motions for summary judgment and in a 
memorandum decision dated June 21, 2001, and an order dated September 25, 2001, the 
trial court entered summary judgment for the county. Both parties then filed motions to 
reconsider resulting in a memorandum decision on March 13, 2002, and an order on April 
8, 2002, which further reduced the remaining issues. The judges on the case rotated and a 
new judge was assigned. The defendants then filed a second motion for summary 
judgment in 2005 and the court entered its order and judgment granting the county's 
second motion for summary judgment on October 24, 2005. 
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III. Disposition in the court below. 
The landowners are appealing a summary judgment on substantive issues, various 
orders on procedural issues, and an order relating to attorney's fees. The summary 
judgment was issued by Judge James Taylor in decisions and orders entered on June 21,7, 
2001; September 25, 2001; March 13, 2002; and April 8, 2002. On November 15, 2001, 
the landowners filed a petition for interlocutory appeal (Case No. 20010813 SC 
(990401676)), which this court denied on June 19, 2002. The various procedural issues 
arose from orders entered on February 7, 2005, and May 31, 2005. The court ordered that 
the landowners pay attorney's fees in various orders entered in 2005. The amended notice 
of appeal was filed on January 19, 2006. 
IV. Statement of facts. 
1. The plaintiffs are landowners in the Canyon Meadows subdivision located in the 
Provo Canyon area of Wasatch County. (R. at 25, 26.) 
2. The defendants are Wasatch County and various county officials and employees. 
(R. at 25, 26.) In particular, Robert Mathis was the Wasatch County Planner and Phil 
Wright is the Wasatch County Health Director. (R. at 2922.) 
3. This case arises out of a series of rolling moratoria imposed by Wasatch County on 
the landowners. (R. at 002-025.) 
4. The Canyon Meadows area has existed for over 35 years. (R. at 530.) 
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5. During the initial development phase, over eight years of testing and study were 
done, during which time experts raised questions on slope stability and the use of 
individual septic systems.1 (R. at 1968-1969, 1979-1980, 1291.) 
6. There were multiple times when Wasatch County reviewed geological information, 
found no prohibitive concerns, and approved 83 lots using individual septic systems. (R. at 
1291, 1279-1280, 1268-1269.) 
7. Over the next two decades Wasatch County had zero concern regarding building in 
Canyon Meadows and over 52 lots were sold and 17 homes were built without any issues 
(R. at 1248-1266.) During this time no septic system failed and only one experienced 
minor difficulties due to poor maintenance. (R. at 1262-1263.) 
8. Aerial photographs taken over 50 years show no movement in Canyon Meadows. 
(R. at 1239-1244.) Homes, roads, water lines and septic systems have existed for over 20 
years with no signs of soil moving, concrete cracking, or pipes separating. (R. at 1264.) 
9. The clear and convincing results of prior studies, the lack of any geological 
movement in recorded history, and actual experience in building, developing, and living in 
1
 See 1964 report indicating the region is stable, but more study should be done by 
any group interested in developing the property (R. at 1343); 1977 report stating flood 
irrigation historically used on the meadow may be one factor in sloughing along the 
highway (R. at 1332); 1977 state health department letter urging special care in the use of 
individual septic systems (R. at 1317); 1978 report listing mitigation steps to reduce water 
impacts on slope stability (R. at 1314); state health department recommendation that 
individual septic systems can be used in Plat A of Canyon Meadows (R. at 1312); 1979 
state health department letter urging careful monitoring of individual septic systems in 
Plat B by the local health department (R. at 1303). 
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Canyon Meadows showed the area is stable ground with adequate soils for individual 
septic systems. (R. at 1239-1244, 1223-1234.) 
10. In 1993, New Canyon Meadows L.L.C. (NCM), a development company, acquired 
all of the unsold lots in the first two phases, and all unplatted areas included in the original 
master plan (R. at 1246), and NCM began to run percolation tests on the unsold lots in 
order to sell them. (R. at 1491.) As members of Canyon Meadows watched these tests, 
they had concerns about the accuracy of the new developer's tests and raised these 
concerns with the county. (R. at 1216-1213, 1248-1266.) Wasatch County ignored the 
homeowners'complaints and did little or nothing to supervise the new developer's 
actions.2 (R. at 1261.) 
11. Simultaneously, NCM planned to expand the subdivision to twice its size by 
platting new lots in the areas shown in the original master plan. (R. at 1246, 1296.) 
12. Also in 1993, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) commissioned a 
geological study of Provo Canyon in anticipation of highway expansion in the area. (R. at 
1239-1244.) This study indicated there was movement by the river and that the entire 
slope might be creeping at a slow pace (5 to 10 mm per year). (R. at 1220-1244.) 
13. In 1994, UDOT informed the county of its concerns about slide potential in the 
road area below the subdivision and its intent to potentially move the road closer to the 
Canyon Meadows subdivision based on better stability than found in the current road 
2
 On one lot NCM conducted percolation tests on the front of the lot, but in 
violation of state and county law, the developer installed the septic system on the back of 
the lot, too close to a natural spring. (R. at 1491.) When informed of this, Wasatch 
County ignored the violation and took no action. Id. 
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alignment. (R. atl236-1237.) UDOT expressed concerns over the impact of 160 septic 
systems in the area as would exist if the subdivision were expanded. (R. at 1229- 1237.) 
At that time, the county responded that there was no way to address septic systems in an 
existing, already approved subdivision and took no other action on the issues raised by 
UDOT. (R. at 1236-1237, Addendum at 1-2.) 
14. For example, on learning of UDOT's concerns NCM commissioned its own 
geotechnical experts to review the study. The experts (AGRA) concluded the movement 
found was so slight it could have been related to settlement of the measuring instruments. ( 
R. at 1234-1229.) The county asked the Utah Geological Survey (UGS) to review NCM's 
work. UGS agreed that the slide was inactive and that the movement in fill materials at 
the river was associated with the existing road alignment. (R. at 1227-1223.) Both 
studies recommended care in expansion of the subdivision, but did not recommend any 
limitation on building other than careful engineering and construction practices. 
15. After speaking with NCM, Defendant Mathis specifically told NCM its recent study 
did not need to be submitted until it sought approval for a new project and that the county 
would not ask for any further studies on slope stability unless it was informed of a hazard 
of which it was not aware of at that time. (R. at 1376.) 
16. As time passed, the concern of the landowners grew over NCMfs questionable sales 
practices and misrepresentations relating to water rights and percolation testing in the area, 
and the county's apathy towards these practices.3 (R. at 1261.) 
3The landowners asked the county attorney to review allegations of fraudulent marketing 
and false statements about water, but the county refused to look into the issues. (R. at 1491.) 
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17. In March of 1996, NCM did submit a plan to the county to double the size of the 
subdivision to 160 lots. (R. at 1213-1216.) 
18. However, due to the county's continued lax attitude towards NCM and the scope of 
its development plans, members of Canyon Meadows felt it necessary to prepare a strong 
opposition to NCM's development proposal. (R. at 1213-1216.) In particular, the property 
owners were concerned about NCM's plans to double the size of the subdivision to 160 
lots. (R. at 1213-1216.) Due to the county's apparent lack of interest or desire to enforce 
its code on NCM, the property owners felt compelled to present a letter highlighting the 
possibility of severe consequences if the county allowed twice as many homes and twice 
as much effluent into the environment in a reckless and unsupervised manner. (R. at 
1213-1216.) 
19. While the property owners' letter warned of dire consequences of reckless 
expansion of the subdivision, it contained only general information on geologic issues not 
specific to Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1216.) 
20. Wasatch County took no action to stop development or curb NCM's development 
plans when it received the property owners' letter. (R. at 1261.) 
21. In the fall of 1996, the Wasatch County Commission directed Robert Mathis, the 
county planner, to meet with the property owners to address their concerns. (R. at 1260-
1261.) During several meetings, the property owners expressed their frustrations with Mr. 
Mathis and the planning department and accused them of failing to enforce the county 
ordinances and regulations. (R. at 1260-1261.) 
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22. These meetings with Bob Mathis eventually became hostile and ended with the 
planner yelling at the members of the property owners' board. (R. at 1261, 1491-1490.) 
23. It was only after Mathis, Wright, and the county commission took personal offense 
that the avalanche of regulations buried Canyon Meadows, destroying the ability to build 
and greatly reducing the value of the homes already built. (R. at 1251.) 
24. In December 1996, while still meeting with the property owners, Mr. Mathis 
drafted Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 (Moratorium 97-1), the first in a series of rolling 
moratoria to be imposed on Canyon Meadows. (R. at 126-1261, 1208-1211.) 
25. Mr. Mathis took it upon himself to draft Moratorium 97-1 without any direction or 
request from the county commission. (R. at 1205-1206.) At no time in his meetings with 
the property owners did Mr. Mathis ever express concerns about slope stability or a need 
for a moratorium. (R. at 1259-1261.) 
26. Mathis drafted Moratorium 97-1 nearly 2 lA years after the UDOT report, over a 
year after the AGRA report and the corresponding UGS comments, and over ten months 
after the property owners initially expressed their concerns over doubling the size of the 
proposed development. (R. at 1269-1260.) 
27. Mathis knowingly misled several prospective buyers who are plaintiffs in this 
action. (R. at 1181-1233.) These landowners contacted defendants Mathis and Wright just 
before the adoption of Moratorium 97-1 to inquire about the ability to secure a building 
permit in Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1181-1233.) These property owners were told they 
would have no problems getting a septic system and building permit on the property. (R. 
at 1181-1233.) However, within only a matter of a weeks of buying properly in Canyon 
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Meadows, the new owners were informed they could not get a septic system approved and 
that they could not build because of Moratorium 97-1. (R. at 1181-1233.) 
28. In adopting Moratorium 97-1 the county reversed 20 years of decision making and 
imposed a total building moratorium on the Canyon Meadows subdivision. (R. at 1208-
1211.) The ordinance went so far as to place express restrictions on the selling of lots and 
prohibiting the use of individual septic systems. (R. at 1208 -1211.) 
29. Despite decades of evidence to the contrary, Moratorium 97-1 stated that the county 
had "serious concerns" about the slide danger in Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1208-1211.) 
Again, this was after previous concerns were repeatedly deemed unwarranted and multiple 
development plats were approved (R. at 1291, 1289, 1269.) 
30. On January 13, 1997, Wasatch County passed and adopted Moratorium 97-1 
without putting the ordinance on its published agenda. (R. at 1175, 1208-1211, 1260.) 
31. Moratorium 97-1 was to expire six months after its effective date. This was June 
22, 1997, as it was published in the local paper on January 22, 1997. (R. at 1208-1211.) 
32. Wasatch County then extended the moratorium by adopting Wasatch County 
Ordinance 97-6 (Moratorium 97-6) on July 21, 1997. (R. at 1159-1168.) 
33. Moratorium 97-6 temporarily prohibited the acceptance or approval of building 
permit applications involving septic tanks and drain fields. The ordinance also prohibited 
the acceptance of building permit applications until a slope stability study could be 
completed. (R. at 1159-1168.) The ordinance also continued restrictions on the selling of 
lots in Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1159-1168.) 
13 
34. Despite the fact that Moratorium 97-6 was never published, both Moratorium 97-1 
and Moratorium 97-6 were enforced by county officials, with Moratorium 97-1 being 
enforced well past its self-contained expiration date. (R. at 1175, 1208-1211, 1248-1266.) 
35. On August 11, 1997, the county passed Wasatch County Ordinance 97-13 
(Moratorium 97-13). (R. at 1155-1157.) 
36. Moratoriums 97-1, 97-6, and 97-13 were not presented to the planning commission 
prior to enactment. (R. at 1205-1206.) 
37. According to the lower court, Moratorium 97-13 "appears to be an attempt to re-
enact, with slight modification, Ordinance 97-6." (R. at 2126-2147.) Moratorium 97-13 
enacted under the authority of Utah Code Annotated 17-27-404, cited the same rationale 
and concerns that prompted the passage of Moratorium 97-6. (R. at 2126-2147.) 
38. Moratorium 97-13 had the effect of extending the moratorium imposed by 
Moratorium 97-1 well beyond the allowed six-month term and continued the moratorium 
with an open-ended termination date, stating it would continue until the commission 
affirmatively took action to change the zoning in Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1155-1157.) 
39. Ironically, Moratorium 97-13 also narrowed the area of the moratorium so as to 
exclude properties around and below the platted lots which were previously included in 
the moratorium. (R. at 1155-1157, 1248-1266.) Effectively the moratoriums largeted only 
the landowners. Even more ironically, Moratorium 97-13 excluded the only areas where 
any new lots could be platted4. (R. at 1155-1157, 1258.) 
4While Moratorium 97-1 covered the entire Canyon Meadows subdivision and the 
surrounding areas down to the Provo River, Moratorium 97-13 shrank the area of the moratorium 
14 
40. By its own terms, Moratorium 97-13 was not effective prior to publication, which 
took place on November 12, 1997. (R. 1155-1157.) 
41. Even though there were lapses of time between the moratoria, the county continued 
a defacto moratorium on the subdivision for nearly 2 lA years.5 Formally the moratorium 
continued until November 13, 2000, when the county officially rescinded Moratorium 97-
13. (R. at 1155-1157, 1159-1168,3299,3268-3271.) 
42. After Moratorium 97-13, the property owners were required to retain their own 
geotechnical engineers to perform slope stability testing. (R. at 1258.) The association 
was forced to pay over $50,000 for this testing despite aerial photos showing no 
movement in the subdivision for half a century and despite the fact that homes, roads, and 
water lines had existed on the subdivision for two decades without any sign of cracking or 
movement. (R. at 1257-1258.) 
43. In addition to the three moratorium ordinances in question, the Wasatch County 
health department adopted several "policies"6 designed to regulate the design and 
installation of septic systems. (R. at 1112, 1127 - 1136, 1138-1141.) These "policies" 
were adopted without public notice or hearing, and when considered in conjunction with 
the requirements of Moratorium 97-13, effectively eliminated the ability of the property 
to the two recorded plats and excluded the areas NCM sought to develop surrounding the 
subdivision. (R. at 1258.) 
5Moratorium 97-13 was still listed on the county records in July 21, 1999. 
6
 These policies were as follows: Policy for Reviewing Requests for an Individual Waste 
Water Permit Requiring Engineering Design; Policy for Reviewing Requests for an Individual 
Waste Water Permit by a Homeowner; Policy for Issuance of Building Permit Clearance; and 
Policy and Procedure for Certification of Percolation Testers. (R . at 112.) 
15 
owners to prepare a building permit application. (R. at 1120-1125, 1138-1141, 1127-
1136,1120-1125, 1075-1118, 1112.) 
44. The county health department began imposing testing requirements on Canyon 
Meadows that were not required in other parts of the county and made it extremely 
difficult to conduct percolation tests (R. at 1073 -1069), and caused the property owners 
great difficulty in finding someone willing to run the tests, because working with Canyon 
Meadows could harm a tester's working relationship with the county. (R. at 1254.) 
45. When Thomas Hicken, a county certified tester, agreed to work in Canyon 
Meadows, the health department began to challenge his work and harass him about work 
he did outside of the subdivision. (R. at 1073-1069.) Mr. Hicken was never treated this 
way until he began working for Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1069.) 
46. The health department also used ground water data to stop building even though it 
was shown that the water table data the county relied on was faulty.7 (R. at 1437-1436.) 
47. The health department also denied septic permits by declaring dry gutters along the 
road as a open "waterways," by declaring small road cut gutters only a few feet high as 
30% slopes (when the true slope was nowhere near 30%), and by declaring the proposed 
septic field too close to an open waterway or 30% slope. A county representative was 
present at all of the testing and would walk over these physical conditions daily, but did 
7
 The monitoring wells the county relied on were shown to be faulty by excavating next 
to a monitoring well that was currently showing the water table close to the surface. Excavations 
went down well below the monitoring wells, but found no water. This occurred repeatedly. It 
was obvious the monitoring wells simply trapped water and did not reflect the true water table, 
but the county ignored this information and refused building permits based on the faulty data. (R. 
at 1437-1436.) 
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not say anything until after the property owner had paid for multiple percolation tests and 
successfully found an area that would work for a septic field. (R. at 1252.) 
48. In an act of a physical takings, the county installed 40 ground water monitoring 
wells on the property owners' private property. Neither the county health department nor 
Wasatch County sought or received permission from the property owners to install the 
monitoring wells, or to drive on their private property heavy equipment and vehicles used 
in the installation. (R. at 1437.) 
49. Further, the health department imposed testing conditions that bore no relationship 
to the soil to be used in a septic system by requiring tests to be conducted at or below a 
depth of 4f 10", while requiring the system be installed near the ground surface. (R. at 
1943-1942, 1936.) 
50. When asked, a health department worker, who supervised percolation tests, could 
not explain the rationale behind the requirement. (R. at 1936-1935.) 
51. Even after the slope stability analysis came back confirming that the area was safe 
for building in the summer of 1998, the county again delayed the process by insisting 
seismic studies be performed before they would even consider removing the moratorium. 
Nowhere else had the county required an existing subdivision to have a seismic 
deformation study performed before building permits could be processed. (R . at 1256.) 
52. In November of 1998, nearly two years after Moratorium 97-1 was imposed, the 
county acknowledged in an open public meeting that it never thought there was any 
movement in the subdivision when it imposed the moratoriums, only the potential for 
stability problems. (R. at 1055.) This acknowledgment directly contradicted the assertions 
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of Mr. Mathis and the county that the multiple moratoriums were because Canyon 
Meadows was on an active slide. (R. at 1255.) General concern regarding potential slope 
stability issues was the same issue that had been raised and resolved 20 years earlier when 
the original development was approved. (R. at 1280.) 
53. County officials have acknowledged that the county's position on the slope stability 
was in response to personality conflicts with Victor Orvis, a property owners' 
representative. Commissioner Ralph Duke told Canyon Meadows they should do 
everything possible to keep Mr. Orvis out of the county because he is hurting them real 
bad and even went on to state that if they didn't get Mr. Orvis out of picture there would 
only be trouble in Canyon Meadows. (R. at 1439-1438.) 
54. Mike Kohler, chairman of the county commission told a local newspaper editor that 
Orvis was interfering in county business and the county was working on a legal action that 
would involve Mr. Orvis personally. (R. at 1369.) 
55. In October of 1997, the county attempted to pass an ordinance that required Canyon 
Meadows to build a sewage treatment plant8. When the planning commission rejected this 
ordinance Mr. Mathis became extremely upset and verbally insulting to the commission. 
(R. at 1257.) When asked why the county was doing this, the county attorney told counsel 
for the property owners that this ordinance would not have happened if Mr. Orvis had not 
been making problems for the county. (R. at 882.) 
8When the idea was presented to top state health officials, the state made it clear that a 
treatment plant would not work in Canyon Meadows because the outflow water would still need 
to be percolated into the soil. (R. at 1257.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Through a series of illegally enacted and illegally enforced rolling moratoria, which 
bore no reasonable relation to a legitimate public purpose, the defendants punished the 
landowners and took away all economic use of the landowners' property for a period of 2 
lA years without compensation and without due process as guaranteed by the constitutions 
of both the United States and the State of Utah. 
Four overriding questions will occupy the main focus of this brief: (1) Did the trial 
court err in concluding that as a matter of no law temporary land use ordinance can 
constitute a taking and that the county's actions relating the adoption and enforcement of 
the rolling moratoria were legal? (2) Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
given the many disputed facts in this case, particularly in light of the U.S. Supreme Court 
holdings in Tahoe, Monterey, and Lucas? (3) Did the trial court err in civil procedure 
matters? (4) Did the court err in awarding attorneys fees to the county? 
I. The trial court erred in concluding that as a matter of law no temporary 
land use ordinance can constitute a taking, and that the county's actions 
relating to the adoption and enforcement of the rolling moratoria were 
legal. 
A. It was err to hold categorically that a temporary moratorium cannot be a 
taking. 
The trial court found "as a matter of law that a land-use regulation that is by its 
terms temporary, meaning finite in duration is not a takings." (R. at 2426)(Addendum at 3-
13.) This legal conclusion is in direct contradiction to the established takings case law. In 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles 
California. 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987), the court established that "[temporary takings 
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which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property are no different in kind from permanent 
takings, for which the constitution clearly requires compensation." In addition in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992), the court held that there are 
at least two discrete categories of regulatory action which are "without case specific 
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses 
regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his property." 
Id. "The second situation . . . is where regulation denies all economically beneficial use of 
productive use of land." Id. 
And finally In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the United States Supreme Court addressed the very issue 
of whether a temporary moratorium constitutes a taking. The court stated that in 
determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, the court must engage in ad hoc, 
factual inquiries designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances. The court expressly rejected the per se approach proposed by the 
petitioners: "In rejecting petitioners1 per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature 
of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that 
it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the other." Id. at 337. 
Clearly, the trial court's finding of a categorical rule that a temporary moratorium 
cannot be a taking does not comport with controlling case law. 
B. The county ignored statutory restrictions in adopting its rolling moratoria. 
First, for 2 Vi years Wasatch County imposed a series of rolling moratoria that 
denied the landowners all viable economic use of their property. Utah Code § 17-27-404 
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limits temporary moratoria to six months and provides for a renewal of such a moratorium 
only in proposed highway or transportation corridors. Wasatch County disregarded this 
clear statutory limitation on its ability to extend its moratoria and imposed three moratoria 
in a row, with the last moratorium being open ended. 
Next, Wasatch County would not consider removing the moratorium until the 
landowners paid over $50,000 for extensive geologic studies. Utah Code § 17-27-
404(1 )(c) prohibits the imposition of a fee or financial condition as part of a temporary 
ordinance. 
C. Procedural defects invalidate the enactment of the moratoria. 
Moratorium 97-1 was not properly noticed as required by Utah's Open Meetings 
Act and was not included on the agenda of the meeting at which it was adopted. Also, all 
of the moratoria at issue were adopted by the county commission without first being 
presented to the planning commission for review and recommendation. While U.C.A § 
17-27-404 expressly eliminated the requirement of holding a public hearing in adopting a 
temporary moratorium, it did not eliminate the other procedural requirements mandated by 
the enabling statute. In ignoring these necessary steps, the county rendered its ordinances 
illegal and void ab initio. 
D. The county's enforcement of the moratoria and related decisions violated 
landowners' constitutional rights. 
In conjunction with the moratoria, the county health board caused 40 ground water 
test wells to be installed on the landowners' property without the property owners' consent 
or approval. These test wells involve a physical presence that remains on the property and 
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as such a physical taking has occurred. Likewise, the health board imposed a number of 
testing requirements and procedures that were not properly adopted at a public hearing as 
required by state law. The imposition of these "policies" is one more example of the 
county's disregard for following state law requirements. It was inappropriate for the trial 
court to bar consideration of the requirement of percolation testing at a depth of 4? 10" 
based on res judicata because the parties dismissed the companion litigation against the 
health board based on the agreement that this would be heard and decided in this litigation. 
This case was filed before the health board case, the issues were raised in this case and 
agreement to address the issues in this case demonstrate res judicata was not appropriate in 
this instance. 
E. Resolution 99-11 violated the landowner' First Amendment rights. 
Resolution 99-11 prohibits any plaintiff from speaking with any county official or 
employee based only on their status as a plaintiff. Contact and information that is 
available to any other citizen of the county is expressly restricted and denied anyone who 
files suit against the county until it is reviewed and consented to by the county attorney. 
Such a treatment of individuals based solely on the exercise of the First Amendment right 
to seek redress from the government, unconstitutionally limits access to information and 
chills the plaintiffs' constitutional right to seek redress. 
II. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment given the many disputed 
facts. 
The essence of this appeal is that there were numerous issues of material fact that 
should have precluded summary judgment; and that the findings of the court on various 
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points of law were clearly erroneous. The determinations of whether a taking occurred 
and whether that taking bore a reasonable relation to a compelling public purpose are 
questions of fact that should have been determined by a jury. In granting summary 
judgment against the landowners, the trial court reached a number of factual conclusions 
that were clearly in dispute. Not only did the trial court reach a factual finding, it did so 
based in part on an expressly stated personal bias. In oral argument, as counsel for the 
landowners noted that while Canyon Meadows was a geologically sensitivity area, it was 
not on an active slide, the court interrupted with the following statements (R. at 4084): 
The Judge: Can I disclose a personal bias? 
Mr. Duval: Sure. 
The Judge: I grew up in Provo Canyon. My folks own a home at Wild Wood9. 
And ever since I've been a little kid I've noticed that right by the 
Hoover slide there's a permanent road damage sign. 
Mr. Duval: Absolutely. 
The Judge: This is an area that has always been known historically, generally 
known to have slides. 
It appears that the judge extrapolated his personal experiences and applied them to 
the facts of this case and found that "[s]ome or all of the development is located on an 
area with a long history of instability and land slippage."( R. at 2139)(Addendum at 42.) 
The trial court found this even though the landowners provided evidence from experts that 
Wild Wood is an area near Canyon Meadows, but closer to the Provo River. 
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the subdivision was stable enough to develop. (R. at 790, 1339, 1327, 1313, 1312, 1289, 
1277, 1271, 1264, 1244, 1234, 1233, 1226, 1563, 1558, 1536, 1376.) 
There is no "long history of instability and land slippage." In fact, just the opposite 
is true. There is absolutely no history of any slippage at all in the subdivision. For over 
20 years there hasn't been so much as a crack in a foundation or pipe or road, and no 
septic system has failed due to soil saturation or movement. Ironically, the county 
continued the moratoria on the subdivision where there were no physical signs of 
movement, while it lifted the moratorium down by the road and Wild Wood and on the 
surrounding lands where there was movement. (R. at 1258.) 
The Tahoe decision outlines seven theories that could support a conclusion that a 
temporary ordinance constitutes a taking of private property. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 333. 
Landowners urge the court to focus on three of these theories. The Fourth Ttheory, (what 
is the functional effect of a series of rolling moratoria in depriving land owners of use of 
their property); the Fifth Theory (were the actions of the governing body made in good 
faith or were there ulterior motives) and the Sixth Theory (did the moratoria substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest). Id. 
III. The trial court erred in matters of civil procedure. 
The trial court struck all plaintiffs originally identified as "John Does" despite the 
fact that the county was informed of their identities and indeed took the depositions of 
numerous plaintiffs ( R. at 2763-2762.) The complaint identified several plaintiffs as John 
Does based on judicial economy concerns about the sell and transfer of lots requiring 
multiple amendments to the complaint each time a new property owner came into the area. 
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The defendants were not prejudiced by this designation as they were given the actual 
names of the plaintiffs, the lots they owned and other relevant information through 
discovery in 1998. Id. Also, the defendants waited nearly a decade to raise this objection 
despite their actual knowledge of the plaintiffs' identities. 
The lower court compelled the homeowners to respond to discovery requests asking 
for pure law, not facts or evidence. The comments in the Rules of Civil Procedure indicate 
that discovery does not extend to issues of "pure law," i.e. legal issues unrelated to the 
facts of a case. The county's discovery requests asked lay witnesses to specifically 
identify "clearly established laws" violated by the defendants. The property owners 
objected to such requests because they asked for legal conclusions. Nevertheless, the 
court compelled the responses and awarded $3,500 in fees against the landowners. An 
award of attorney's fees is unjust when "an impartial observer would agree that a party 
had a good reason to withhold discovery." 
IV. The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the county. 
The lower court's order of attorney's fees is an abuse of discretion for five reasons. 
First, the court failed to show that the landowners' claims were frivolous, vexatious, or 
brought for harassment purposes as required by established case law. Also, the 
landowners made no concession that their claims were frivolous or without merit, only that 
it was in the best interests of all parties to avoid a lengthy trial when the main body of the 
landowners' case had already been dismissed. It was also necessary to proceed to the 
stage of a motion for summary judgment to preserve the remaining issues for appeal. If 
the landowners had moved to dismiss their remaining claims without the county's moving 
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for summary judgment, they would have lost the right to include the claims upon winning 
this appeal. Also the lower court engaged in erroneous post hoc reasoning after the entry 
of judgment basing the award on the fact that the defendants prevailed on all claims 
brought by landowners in this case. This was despite the fact that the landowners 
remaining claims were supported by facts and cannot be considered "meritless." 
ARGUMENT 
I. In light of First English Evangelical's holding that "temporary takings which . 
. . deny a landowner all use of his property are no different in kind from 
permanent takings, for which the constitution clearly requires compensation," 
the trial court erred when it found "as a matter of law that a land-use 
regulation that is by its terms temporary, meaning finite in duration, is not a 
taking." 
The trial court's ruling states that as a matter of law, "a land use regulation that is 
by its terms temporary, meaning finite in duration, is not a taking." This ruling has been 
expressly overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). The High Court found 
that the questions regarding whether a moratorium constituted a taking are "essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all relevant 
circumstances."Id. at 302-303. 
In Tahoe, the petitioners sought a ruling that any temporary moratorium of any 
duration is a per se taking, and while the High Court clearly held that it would not adopt 
such a rule, it likewise made equally clear that it is not appropriate to apply a per se rule 
that a moratorium is, as a matter of law, never a taking, which is exactly what the trial 
court has done in this case, L± at 337: 
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In rejecting petitioner's per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature 
of the land-use restriction precludes the finding that it effects a taking; we 
simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way 
or the other. 
The Tahoe court reiterated the well established fact that there are two categories of 
takings cases, one where the government action affects a physical invasion or permanently 
deprives all economically viable use, and the other where regulations go far enough to take 
private property rights. The court made clear that the second category "necessarily entails 
complex factual assessments of purposes and economic effects of government action." Id. 
at 325 (citing Yee v. Escondido. 503 U.S. 519, 523, (1992), and Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Indeed, the majority opinion stated that the 
three year moratorium in Tahoe may well be a taking, but because the plaintiffs' appeal 
only argued for a per se rule, the court could not address the correctness of the trial court's 
factual findings. Ld. at 339. The court emphasized that in addressing any claim made 
under the Just Compensation Clause, it is required to interpret the word "taken" and that in 
regulatory takings, this mandates a more complex analysis of the facts to determine if a 
private party's property has been taken. Id. at Footnote 17. 
The necessity of this complex and detailed analysis of the facts, which cannot be 
done in a motion for summary judgment when material facts are in dispute, is further 
enhanced by the Utah Constitution. Article I, Section 22, requires Utah courts to interpret 
not only the word "taken" but also the word "damaged," which implicitly indicates a 
broader degree of protection and has been recognized as such by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Bagfordv.EphraimCitv, 904 P.2d 1 095 (Utah 1995). 
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In Tahoe, the court outlined seven issues a court may consider in place of a 
categorical per se rule. These included looking at the effect of "rolling" moratoria that 
work to deny all viable economic uses of the property, looking into the government's 
intent and whether there were ulterior motives, analyzing whether the moratorium 
substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, and finally, examining what was the 
actual impact of the moratorium on individual lot owners. Tahoe at 333-335. 
Furthermore,"[i]t may well be that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year 
should be viewed with special skepticism," Id. at 339, but the court went on to say that a 
general per se rule would be too broad. The court then indicated that the state legislatures 
are better suited to establish what are reasonable time frames for moratoria. 
The High Court, both the majority and the dissent, then went on to cite to Utah's 
moratorium statute, as an example of when a legislature had made a determination of how 
long a reasonable moratorium should last. Id. at majority footnote 37, dissent footnote 5.) 
These statutory limits are of significant importance in determining if a particular 
moratorium constitutes a taking, yet the trial court ignores this fact in its rulings, adopting 
instead a per se rule that any moratorium that is by its terms temporary, meaning finite in 
duration, is not a taking. 
At the heart of this case is U.C.A § 17-27-404 where the Utah legislature set the 
appropriate length of time for a building moratorium in Utah. Wasatch County clearly 
violated the statute by enacting and enforcing three rolling moratoria that went well 
beyond the statutory authority. Clearly, the taking alleged by property owners is the kind 
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of matter which the Tahoe Court suggested should be viewed with "special skepticism." It 
is not an issue to be determined on summary judgment when facts are in dispute. 
The holding in Tahoe, combined with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. LTD, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1644 (1999), 
(discussed infra) indicate the need for this court to confirm that temporary takings can 
require compensation under the Utah constitution. 
In First English Evangelical, 107 S.Ct. at 2388, the court held that under the Just 
Compensation Clause of the United States Constitution, "temporary takings which . . . 
deny a landowner all use of his property, are no different in kind from permanent takings, 
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation." The court further held that: 
Where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of 
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty 
to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective. 
The protections found in First English Evangelical are founded upon the U.S. 
constitution, but the Utah constitution expressly provides even more protections than the 
federal constitution. While the U.S. constitution requires compensation when property is 
"taken" by government action, the Utah constitution raises the level of protection, 
guaranteeing compensation when private property is taken or "damaged." Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22. The plain language of Utah's constitution mandates that Utah 
citizens are to be compensated for damages as well as actual takings. Here the county's 
actions have both taken property for multiple years and directly damaged the landowners' 
property. 
29 
II. It is a physical taking when a county enters on private land with heavy 
equipment and drills and installs permanent monitoring wells, all without the 
consent of the landowner. 
In 1982 the U. S. Supreme Court decided Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982), which involved a minor but physical taking of the 
plaintiff landowner's building. In Loretto, the defendant city enacted a statute that 
provided that a private landlord must permit a cable television company to install its cable 
television facilities on the landlord's property and could not demand payment from the 
company in excess of the amount determined by a state commission to be reasonable. The 
state commission ruled that a one-time $1 payment was a reasonable fee. 
The court determined that the statute constituted a permanent physical occupation 
of the plaintiffs premises. The court held that "a permanent physical occupation 
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may 
serve. Our constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and the 
purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention." Loretto at 419. As a result, the city 
was required to pay just compensation for the physical taking of plaintiff s property. 
The present case is similar to Loretto. After the approval of Moratorium 97-1, the 
county hired a geotechnical engineering company to perform ground water table studies on 
the landowners' land in the Canyon Meadows subdivision. Without input, authority or 
permission of the plaintiff landowners (and without any compensation to them) the 
county's engineers entered the landowners' property (R. at 1437), drilled or dug 40 wells 
on the landowners' property, and installed monitoring devices on the landowners' 
property. Id. The landowners have been denied the right to control their own property. 
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The Supreme Court has established that any permanent physical invasion of private 
property constitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
III. The trial court erred when it dismissed the landowners' claim that the "series 
of rolling moratoria" were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. 
In analyzing the county's position it is important to note that the county's actions 
must be in "strict compliance" with the relevant state statutes and applicable ordinances. 
In Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 21 P.3d 245 (Utah Ct. Ap. 2001), the Utah appellate 
court said: 
The authority to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is conferred 
on municipalities by the state through enabling statutes. See Utah Code 
Ann. 10-9-401-409 (1999). As such, "[c]ities must strictly comply with the 
statute delegating them the authority to act." Jachimek v. Superior Ct.,. . . 
819 P.2d 487, 489 (1991). Consequently, "[fjailure to strictly follow the 
statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid." Call v. 
City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). See also Schwarz v. 
CitvofGlendale.... 950 P.2d 167, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) 
("Municipalities must strictly follow the statutory procedure to enact a 
zoning ordinance."); Stockwell v. City of Ritzville. . . . 663 P.2d 151,151 
(1983)(upholding the trial court's determination that "the ordinance was 
invalidly enacted due to the Council's failure to comply strictly" with the 
enabling statute). 
It is important to note that land use statutes and ordinances are not merely 
guidelines that may be disregarded to suit the needs and interests of the county. Thurston 
v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 1981)(municipal zoning authorities are 
bound by the terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to 
make land use decisions in derogation thereof); Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044, 
1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(stated simply, the city cannot "change the rules halfway 
31 
through the game"); Springville Citizens v. Springville, 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999)(the city 
is not entitled to disregard its mandatory ordinances). 
A. When § 17-27-404(2) stated that a county commission "shall establish a period 
of limited effect for the temporary ordinances not to exceed six months/' the county 
acted illegally when it imposed "a series of rolling moratoria" that exceeded six 
months. 
No building permits were issued for 2 Vi years because of the express and defacto 
moratoria imposed by the county on Canyon Meadows. The three moratorium ordinances 
are included in the Addendum at pages 14-23. Moratorium 97-1 became effective on 
January 1, 1997, and even though numerous applications had been pending, no building 
permits were issued until late 1998. According to the express terms of Moratorium 97-13, 
the moratorium was still in place until November of 2000. This is a direct violation of the 
state code and as such the moratoria are illegal and invalid. 
The position that the county can impose moratorium after moratorium, year after 
year, simply make a nullity out of the statutory limitation of six months. Under this 
position a six month moratorium could last for years and years (just as it did in this case) 
and could theoretically last indefinitely. All that would be required is for the county to 
"re-adopt" a moratorium every six months. More alarmingly, this could be done without 
ever involving the very property owners whose land is being taken. This would indeed be 
an effective way to prevent development, but it completely violates the intent and spirit of 
the County Land Use Development and Management Act. 
Besides being an obvious contradiction of the intent of § 17-27-404, the 
defendant's position again ignores the plain language of the statute. Subsection (3) of 
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Section 404 does in fact talk about when a moratorium can be "renewed/' but the option is 
limited to highway or transportation corridors, a circumstance that does not apply to the 
Canyon Meadows subdivision. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and 
based on the fact that the legislature considered the issue of renewing moratoria and 
decided to allow it in only very limited circumstances, it is clear the legislature intended to 
allow the extension of moratoria only in proposed highway or transportation corridors. If 
the legislature had intended to allow renewed moratoria outside of transportation corridors, 
it would have been included in the statute. 
B. When $ 17-27-404(1 ¥c) says that a moratorium "may not impose . . . [a] 
financial requirement on building or development/' the county acted 
illegally when it passed a "series of rolling moratoria" that prohibit all 
building unless the landowners spent almost $50.000 on testing. 
After the county enacted Moratorium 97-13, it would not even consider removing 
the moratorium until the landowners paid for an extensive study showing the area was 
stable. As a result, the landowners were required to spend over $50,000 to complete the 
slope stability studies demanded by the county. This was in direct contradiction of Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-404(l)( c) which states "a temporary zoning regulation under 
subsection (l)(a) may not impose an impact fee or other financial requirement on building 
or development." Wasatch County's refusal to consider removing the moratorium until 
the property owners paid for the expensive study constitutes the imposition of a "financial 
requirement" and therefor the moratorium is void as violating state law. 
In addressing this point, the trial court found, erroneously, "that these costs were an 
alternative expense that permit seekers would have to incur if they declined to wait for the 
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other study to be done." (R. at 2151.) In fact, Wasatch County refused to lift the 
moratorium and continued to enforce it until the property owner's paid for the study. (R. at 
1258.) Accordingly, the court's finding that the requirement "did not constitute a fee for 
statutory purposes," or that there was some alternative to meeting this financial 
requirement is incorrect and should be reversed. 
C. In light of Call which held that ordinances adopted without public notice are 
void ab initio, the county acted illegally when it adopted a moratorium 
ordinance without giving any notice that it would be acting on such an 
ordinance at a public meeting. 
Moratorium 97-1 was not placed on the agenda for the January 13, 1997, meeting 
where it was enacted. (R. at 1366)(Addendum at 34.) Even though U.C.A. § 17-27-404 
allows temporary ordinances without a "public hearing," it does not relieve the county of 
the obligation to provide public notice of official action. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6(2) of 
the open meetings act states "each public body shall give not less than 24 hours' public 
notice of the agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings." It is well understood 
that public bodies cannot take action on those items not listed on the agenda. Carter v. 
Citv of Salina and the Salina Citv Council 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985). The minutes for 
that January 13 meeting confirm that Moratorium 97-1 was passed on that date, (R. at 
1364.)(Addendum at 35-37.) As it was not on the agenda, the enactment of Moratorium 
97-1 violated state law and is void ab initio. 
The trial court ruled that property owners' challenge to Moratorium 97-1 was not 
timely because it was not filed within 30 days as required by Utah Code Ann., § 17-27-
1001. However, in Toone v. Weber Citv, 57 P.3d 1079 (Utah 2002), this court held that 
34 
the 30 day limitation in § 17-27-1001 applies to substantive challenges, not the procedural 
challenges raised by the property owners. Id. at f^ 9. 
Section 17-27-1001 does not apply, however, where a party seeks relief 
from a county's violation of the provisions of CLUDMA because a county's 
failure to follow the procedures mandated by CLUDMA is not a "land use 
decision" made under CLUDMA. In such instances, a party may bring an 
action under the next following section, section 17—27—1002, which 
provides county land owners with the right to institute actions based on 
"violations" of the Act and, tellingly, does not contain a thirty-day limitation 
on such actions. 
As argued above, the county failed to comply with procedural due process 
requirements in enacting Moratorium 97-1 by not first presenting it to the planning 
commission and by failing to give public notice. Applying the holding in Toone to the 
present case, § 17-27-1001 does not act as a bar to the property owners' challenge. 
D. When § 17-27-403(1 )(b) stated that a county commission "may not make 
any amendment" to the land use code without first submitting the 
amendment "to the planning commission for its approval disapproval or 
recommendations/' the county acted illegally when it passed a moratorium 
ordinance that had not been submitted first to the planning commission. 
In 1997 §§ 17-27-402 and 403 of the Utah Code stated that the county commission 
could not enact or amend any zoning regulations unless the regulation was proposed by the 
planning commission or was first submitted to the planning commission for its approval, 
disapproval, or recommendation. The county ignored these statutory requirements in 
adopting its moratoria as they were presented directly to the county commissioners and 
were not presented to the planning commission. (R. at 1205.) 
A county only has such authority to regulate land uses as is delegated to it by the 
state legislature. In Dewev v. Doxev-Lavton Realty Co, 277 P.2d 805 (Utah 1954). 
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While zoning laws give local legislative bodies broad discretionary power, "when the 
method for the exercise of the power is prescribed by the statute, such method is the 
measure of the power to act." Id. at 808. The county only has power to enact zoning 
regulations according to the procedures outlined in the enabling statute. 
Utah Code Ann., § 17-27-402 requires a zoning regulation first receive a 
recommendation from the planning commission and then be presented in a public hearing, 
with at least two weeks public notice. These steps cannot be passed over unless the 
legislative body is expressly relieved of the obligation to follow these procedures. See 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. Springville City. 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 
1999)(zoning authorities are bound by the terms of applicable zoning ordinances and may 
not make land use decisions in derogation thereof. 
After setting out these procedures in § 402, the legislature expressly removed the 
requirement of a public hearing for a temporary zoning ordinance in § 17-27-404. 
However, this is the only obligation the legislature removed from the procedural process 
for enacting a temporary zoning ordinance. The county argued that if the legislature 
intended temporary ordinances to go to the planning commission it would have said so. 
But, in interpreting statutes, the court is to look at the plain language and should not guess 
at legislative intent if it is not necessary. Provo City v. Cannon. 994 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999)(We look first to the statute's plain language as the best indicator of the 
legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute). 
The legislature expressly required zoning ordinances and amendments be 
submitted to the planning commission and a public hearing held. Then, for temporary 
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ordinances the legislature expressly removed the duty to hold a public hearing. It did 
nothing to remove the planning commission requirement. In terms of legislative intent, it 
is assumed that the legislature acts knowingly and considers the impact of its actions on 
the code as a whole. Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). 
It is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind 
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held that 
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new 
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in 
those prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. 
This reasoning is supported by the statutory cannon ofexpressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. This maxim is based on 
the idea of negative implication. The enumeration of certain items in a statute indicates 
the legislature considered the issue and deliberately selected the items not to include. The 
exclusion of an item that would have been considered, demonstrates the intent to exclude 
that particular item. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994). 
It is well established that the failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in 
enacting an ordinance renders it invalid. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 
(Utah 1986)(citing Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975). No 
moratorium was ever presented to the Wasatch County Planning Commission and as such 
they should be declared invalid. 
E. The inclusion of restraints on alienation in a temporary moratorium are not 
authorized in § 17-27-404 and the county acted illegally to include such 
restraint in its rolling moratoria. 
The ordinances were invalid because in enactment and enforcement they exceeded 
the authority granted by state law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-402(l)(6) the county 
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is granted the authority to pass temporary zoning regulations which "prohibit, restrict, or 
regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction or alteration of any building or structure 
or subdivision approval." This enabling statute is very specific and very limited. No other 
power is given to the county under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-402. However, the county 
placed express restrictions and conditions on the sale of land within the moratorium area. 
Each ordinance contained provisions that "prohibit the sale of land" unless specific actions 
are taken. (R at 1209, 1166, 1155.) Placing restraints on alienation is not a power granted 
to the county under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-402. 
IV. When § 26A-1-121(1)( c) stated that the health department "shall 
provide public hearings prior to the adoption of any regulation or 
standard," the county acted illegally when it adopted numerous 
regulations on septic field installation without holding a public hearings. 
The septic policies (Addendum at 24-33) imposed on Canyon Meadows were 
invalid because the county health department did not publish notice and hold public 
hearings prior to their adoption. Utah Code Ann. § 26a-l-121 (1) provides that health 
departments, "shall provide public hearings prior to the adoption of any regulation or 
standard. Notice of any public hearing shall be published at least twice throughout the 
county or counties served by the local health department." When the statute requires a 
public hearing, more than a regular public meeting is necessary. The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that "because the statute calls for a public hearing our legislature contemplated 
something more than a regular [public] meeting be held." Call at 183. The court went on to 
state that in a public hearing, "our legislature contemplated that interested parlies would 
have an opportunity to give their views, pro and con, regarding a specific legislative 
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proposal, and thereby aid the municipal government in making its land use decisions," 
(citing R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 4.1 1 (2d ed. 1976) and A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1976). 
In this case it is undisputed that the county health department failed to publish any 
notice in the local newspaper prior to adopting the policies. When asked specifically 
whether notice was published in the newspaper for the meetings in which each of the 
policies were adopted, Mr. Wright stated that they were not. (R. at 1125-1120.) Further, 
once the polices were passed in these stealth meetings, no notice of the board's actions 
was published, thereby keeping the public uninformed. (R. at 1113-1112.) 
Also, the county requires all percolation tests in Canyon Meadows be conducted at 
the arbitrary depth of 4' 10" but then requires that the systems be placed no deeper than 
ten inches below the surface. This predetermined depth is arbitrary, illegal, and in direct 
violation of Subsection 5.4(A) of Rule R317-4-5 of the Utah Administrative Code that 
stated that "[w]hen percolation tests are made, such tests shall be made at points and 
elevations selected as typical of the area in which the absorption system will be located." 
The rule clearly establishes that testing must be conducted at the level or elevation the 
system is going to be installed. Requiring Canyon Meadows residents to conduct their 
tests a full four feet below where their systems are going to be installed is in direct 
violation of that standard. 
The trial court ruled that the issue of requiring landowners to perform percolation 
tests at a depth of 4f 10", was barred by res judicata. (R. at 2438.) This ruling is erroneous 
for several reasons. First, the parties stipulated to dismissing the separate action against 
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the health department with the understanding that these issues would be addressed in this 
case. The suit against the health department was brought after the county refused to 
acknowledge that these policies were not properly adopted and continued to enforce them 
despite the fact that they had never been submitted to a public hearing as required by state 
statute. After nearly two years of litigation, the health department finally held public 
hearings and re-adopted the policies in September of 2000. The landowners 
acknowledged that once properly adopted there was no need to continue separate litigation 
to enjoin the application of the policies. The only issue that remained was the legality of 
the past application of the policies. The parties agreed that these septic issues were 
properly included in the present case and would be addressed herein. Based upon that 
understanding, the landowners stipulated to dismissing the separate action against the 
health board. A minute entry dated October 3, 2000, reflecting a conference between the 
parties and the court stated (Addendum at 38): 
There will be no record of this hearing, the parties appearing by telephone. 
Mr. Wentz reports that there is only one remaining issue in this case, all 
other issues being decided in other cases. The Court prepares a scheduling 
order that will be mailed to all parties. This case is set for final pre-trial on 
February 21, 2001 at 9:00 am for three hours. 
Because the parties agreed to address the issues in this case, there has not been a 
final judgment on the merits. The parties' positions were never argued and the merits 
were never addressed. The county's adoption and application of the septic policies 
without first holding a public hearing, the county's prolonged refusal to address the issue, 
and then the sudden change of position and re-adoption of the policies are relevant facts 
that help to establish a pattern of arbitrary conduct. Since the parties stipulated to dismiss 
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the separate action against the health board and to address the facts in this case, res 
judicata does not bar the court from considering the validity of the septic health policies 
from 1996 until they were re-adopted in September of 2000. 
V. In light of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the 
"right of the people . . . to petition the government for redress," the 
county acted illegally when it cut off citizens' rights to speak with 
elected and appointed officials simply because those citizens filed suit 
against the county. 
Resolution 99-11 reads in pertinent part (R. at 1047)(Addendum at 39-40): 
When plaintiffs attempt to communicate with an elected official, or the 
above-described department heads or county employees regarding matters 
related to pending litigation, the elected official, county department head or 
county employee shall immediately terminate the communication and refer 
the plaintiff to the County Attorney's Office. In its discretion, the Wasatch 
County Attorney's Office shall elect whether or not the County Attorney's 
Office, the department head, or County employee will respond to such 
communications related to pending litigation. 
Resolution No. 99-11 violates landowners' First Amendment rights which provide 
that, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or . . . to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." Such a right is a fundamental right subject to 
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,17 (1973). As these rights are 
explicitly protected by the constitution, any governmental action seeking to impinge upon 
them must pass the heightened test of strict scrutiny. While not addressing the First 
Amendment directly, in San Antonio School Dist. the Supreme Court explained that the 
rights explicitly protected by the constitution are to be reviewed under strict scrutiny: 
"[We] must decide, first whether the Texas system . . . operates to the disadvantage of 
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some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected 
by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny." Id. 
Strict scrutiny requires the regulation be based on much more than simply a rational 
basis. It requires that the state have a compelling reason and that the means of promoting 
the compelling state interest must be narrowly drawn. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist. 29 F. 
Supp, 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998)(for equal protection claims based on a fundamental 
constitutional right, the proper standard of review is strict scrutiny); also see Summum v. 
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997)(at a minimum, to survive strict scrutiny the 
[government's] policy must be "narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling stale interest"). 
The courts have recognized that the basic principals the founding fathers enumerated in 
the constitution cannot be diluted or diminished on the whim of local government. Any 
enactment affecting these express constitutional rights must pass the heightened test of 
strict scrutiny. Resolution 99-11 is just such a law. The resolution requires different and 
more restrictive government treatment for those who exercise their right to seek redress 
from their government through litigation. Information and services that are open and free 
to any member of the public are suddenly cut off and not available to someone who seeks 
redress through the court. 
A. Resolution 99-11 violates landowners' First Amendment right to petition the 
government by denying landowners' access to their government. 
Resolution 99-11 violates landowners' First Amendment right to petition the 
government because it denies landowners access to their government. In McDonald v. 
Smith, 105 S.Ct, 2787, 2789 (1985), the Supreme Court said that the First Amendment 
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"right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of the Amendment, and 
is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." In Eastern Railroad President's 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. Inc. 81 S.Ct. 523, 530 (1961), the Supreme Court 
further asserted that "[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to congress an intent to invade these 
freedoms." 
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 92 S.Ct. 609, 612 (1972), 
the Supreme Court held that "[t]he right to petition extends to all departments of the 
government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to 
petition." Certainly, Resolution 99-11, which expressly prevents landowners from 
communicating with elected or appointed officials of their county government, violates 
landowners' First Amendment right to petition the government. A person should be able 
to seek redress from elected officials. 
B. Resolution 99-11 violates landowners' First Amendment right of freedom of 
speech. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the protection of freedom of speech extends "to 
the communication, to its source and to its recipients."Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy 
a consumer group challenged a regulation prohibiting certain types of advertising and the 
court held that the prohibition violated consumers' First Amendment right to receive 
information. Likewise, Resolution 99-11 on its face, and as applied, violates the First 
Amendment right of the landowners in the present action because it denies them the right 
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to receive information from their county government based solely on their status as a 
litigant. Communications that any citizen, other than a plaintiff, can access is denied 
because the person had to seek redress of grievances against the county. Resolution 99-11 
violates landowners' First Amendment right because it denies landowners the right to 
receive information from and have access to their county government solely because of a 
pending lawsuit. 
ISSUES WHERE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
BECAUSE THE ISSUES ARE "FACT-BOUND" QUESTIONS 
THAT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE JURY. 
VI. In light of Monterey, which held that "it was proper to submit this 
narrow, fact-bound question to the jury," summary judgment was not 
appropriate where landowners raised questions of fact on the issue of 
whether or not the moratoria "substantially advance[d] a legitimate 
state interest." 
In granting summary judgment on this issue the Court made the following findings 
of fact which should have been presented to the jury for a factual determination: 
1. "Some or all of the development is located on an area with a long history of 
instability and land slippage." (R. at 2154.) 
2. "There has been justified concern regarding slope stability and suitability of 
the area for building and especially for septic systems." Id. 
3. "The undisputed evidence is that there has been a legitimate concern over 
the geology of the development area for a substantial period of time." (R. at 
2152.) 
4. "The Court has already concluded that there was a compelling public interest 
in determining whether the slope was stable and whether septic tanks were 
viable and that the moratorium enacted upon development was a legitimate 
legislative response to a public welfare need." (R. at 2152-51.) 
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"The challenge to Ordinance 97-13 under this cause of action is found to be 
without merit, as a matter of law since the Ordinance appears to be a 
legitimate legislative response to a public welfare concern." (R. at 2150.) 
"Plaintiffs were concerned that problems would occur if surrounding areas 
were developed. This concern coupled with reports from state and private 
agencies caused the county to impose the moratoria until they could be sure 
there was no public health risk or other concerns." (R. at 2149.) 
"The court finds that it would be adverse to the public interest for the State 
not to be able to monitor ground water levels in this area." (R. at 2143.) 
"The court finds that no compensable taking has occurred. (R. at 2152.) 
Implicit in this finding is that the moratoria were enacted for a legitimate 
public purpose and did not take all economially beneficial use of the 
landowners' property. 
"Moreover, government entities may, under proper circumstances, deprive 
property owners of all economic benefit of their property if it could have 
otherwise been done under a theory of nuisance. See Lucas v. South 
Carolina Costal Council 505 U.S. 1003. The Court considers the plaintiffs' 
own concerns about contaminated ground water, seepage of effluent on to 
other property and slope instability as sufficient reasons to impose this 
moratorium." (R. at 2149.) 
"The court finds that there was a legitimate concern of a threat to public 
safety to justify the moratoria." (R. at 2149-48.) 
"The court finds that the county become reasonably concerned about the 
general suitability of the area for building and properly acted under its police 
authority to protect public health and safely." (R. at 2148.) 
"The fact that prior regulations and/or approvals existed or were made 
merely reinforces the legitimacy of the conclusions that an emergency 
moratorium was required until further study was complete." (R . at 2148.) 
"The court finds that the classification had a rational basis based on concerns 
of the plaintiffs, other concerns about slope stability, and septic tank 
suitability." (R. at 2147.) 
"Given the deference that the court must give to legislative findings, the 
court finds that there was sufficient basis for the county to find that a 
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compelling countervailing public interest existed at the time the ordinances 
were enacted." (R. at 2145.) 
15. "The court finds that there were sufficient facts to support the findings of the 
legislature notwithstanding an incomplete report, if it was, in fact, 
incomplete." (R. at 2144.) 
(Addendum at 41-54.) 
As shown below, each of the above findings of fact were placed in dispute by the 
landowners through their affidavits and deposition testimony. And as such, should have 
been presented to the jury. 
It is well established that a "land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 
'substantially advances legitimate state interests' AND does not 'deny an owner 
economically viable use of his land." Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 
(1994), quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S.Ct. 2138 (1980)(emphasis added). The 
moratoria imposed on Canyon Meadows did not advance legitimate public interests. 
Defendants allege that the moratoria were imposed "to guard against public health 
hazards or potential nuisance" but that claim is simply a pretext. The county reviewed 
multiple studies on slope stability and septic systems for years before approving the 
development and did not perceive any health hazard in Canyon Meadows until the 
property owners criticized county officials. Indeed, at the time of original approval, the 
county commissioners specifically asked about soil structure and subsidence (R. at 1289): 
Commissioner Coleman stated he was concerned about the soil 
structure of the area would be subject to subsidence and that the County 
would be liable to lot owners for approving a subdivision on land subject to 
subsidence. Mr. Mathis responded that the geologist for the State and 
developer have inspected the area and advised that subsidence could be 
avoided if prudent construction techniques are followed. 
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Property owners and their predecessors, conducted comprehensive studies which 
conclusively determined that the use of septic systems within Canyon Meadows did not 
present a hazard. (R. at 1339,1327,1313, 1289,1277,1271.) There was no physical 
evidence of slope movement or other hazards for over 20 years. (R. at 1264.) 
The county relied heavily on the studies and letters that followed the 1994 UDOT 
study, especially a letter expressing the property owners' concerns written ten months 
before Moratorium 97-1 was imposed. However, the county consistently ignores the fact 
that each of these studies or letters was based on expanding the development from just 
over 80 lots to 160 lots. (R. at 1563, 1376, 1237, 1216, 1173.) The property owners did 
express concerns and did recognize that nearly doubling the size of the existing 
subdivision could have an impact and that is why they went to Wasatch County asking it 
to carefully review the proposed expansion. However, the county ignored these 
complaints until Mr. Mathis' became offended by the questions posed to him in 
December of 1996. (R. at 1260-1259, 1491-1490.) 
Furthermore, in reaching its conclusions about slope stability in November of 1998, 
the county relied on a report published by the Transportation Research Board defining 
landslides based on their degree of movement. (R. at 790.) This report defined slope 
movement which is less than 0.63 inches per year as extremely slow and "imperceptible 
without instruments" and states that construction is "possible with precautions." What is 
important about this definition of landslides is that it was available in 1996, and the UDOT 
report showed the absolute worst possible movement in Canyon Meadows at 5 to 10 mm 
per year. (R. at 1243.) This converts to just 0.19 to 0.39 inches per year. Even at its 
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worst, the possible movement listed in the UDOT report, and which the county used to 
justify its moratoria, clearly did not rise to the level of a threat to public safety and did not 
require the suspension of construction. 
It is also important to note that none of the information cited by the defendants 
called for a moratorium or a stop of development in the existing subdivision. Bob Mathis 
acknowledged as much in a letter to NCM. (R. at 1376)(Addendum at 55.) These 
conditions contrast those found in Timber Lakes where homes were actually being 
destroyed by landslides, yet no action was taken to address the slope issues in Timber 
Lakes until the landowners began complaining to the county about equal protection. (R. at 
1493-1492.) The only thing that truly compelled the county to impose these moratoria 
was Bob Mathis' personal vendetta and a county commission that abdicated its 
responsibility by rubber stamping the ordinances that Mr. Mathis put in front of them. 
A. In the context of a temporary regulation under $ 17-27-404, the federal 
standard of a "legitimate state interest" is heightened by § 17-27-404 which 
requires a "compelling, countervailing public interest." 
The controlling standard of review was established by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
Monterey, 119 S.Ct. 1624, where the court acknowledged the traditional "rational basis" 
standard for reviewing government land-use decisions, but then established a second, less 
deferential, standard for this type of land-use decision, called the "reasonable relationship" 
standard. Id. at 1636-1637. In establishing this standard, the Supreme Court upheld jury 
instructions stating that a city's decision did not substantially advance a legitimate public 
interest if "there was no reasonable relationship between the city's denial of the . . . 
proposal and legitimate public purposes." Id. at 1636. The "reasonable relationship" 
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standard of review applies when the government's action is limited to a specific piece of 
property. IcL Utah Code Ann. 17-27-404(l)(a) indicates that for a temporary moratorium 
adopted without public input, the standard is higher: there must by a "reasonable 
relationship" between the county's actions and a "compelling, countervailing public 
interest." 
MI. Summary judgment was not appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether the county had ulterior motives, 
bad faith, or malice in adopting a "series of rolling moratoria" that 
prohibited building for 2 Vi years. 
The intent behind the moratoria, a relevant factor to consider according to Tahoe, is 
a question for the jury. Intent, especially relating to malice and bad faith, is a question of 
fact. Ses Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co, 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998)("We emphasize that 
intent is a question of fact"); Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(whether a person has acted with malice is a question of fact)(citing West v. Thomson 
Newspapers. 835 P.2d 179, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
The landowners have alleged facts sufficient to present the question to the jury. 
The county took no action until the county planner was personally offended. The county 
never believed there was any movement in the subdivision yet it stopped all development 
and the sale of property for years. On various occasions county elected and appointed 
officials expressly stated that county actions directly affecting Canyon Meadows were 
based on personal dislike and animosity towards a property owners' representative. These 
allegations are supported by affidavits and provide a sufficient basis to take this matter to a 
fact finder to determine intent. 
49 
VIII. Summary judgment was not appropriate on the fact intensive 
determination of whether the "series of rolling moratoria" were 
justified on the theory of nuisance. 
The trial court never got to the question of deprivation of all economical use of the 
land, because it simply held "to the extent the zoning regulations at issue deprive 
landowners of all economic benefit of their property, landowners' actions fail because the 
County could have similarly regulated the property under a theory of nuisance." Again, 
this takes us back to the Lucas decision. 
While Lucas did acknowledge uses constituting a nuisance can be abated under 
common law principles without compensation, the court also explicitly stated that it is the 
burden of the state to show that a nuisance in fact exits before taking land without just 
compensation. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-1032. 
Again, Utah courts have long recognized that nuisance is a question of fact and in 
order to win on a nuisance claim there has to be a showing of actual impact or 
encroachment, not unsubstantiated speculation. In Blonquist v. Summit County. 483 P.2d 
430, 431 (Utah 1971), the court recognized that for the state to properly exercise its 
authority to abate a nuisance, it must be sure that the use is a nuisance in fact. 
Under Lucas, in order to prevail on this issue, the county has to demonstrate it is 
doing no more than what "could have been achieved in the courts by adjacent landowners . 
. .[or] by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public 
generally or otherwise." Lucas at 1028.10 The defendants' passing reference in their 
10In Footnote 16, the Lucas court explained that by including the "otherwise" language 
they had in mind limiting liability for destruction of property to prevent the spread of fire or 
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pleadings to a possible nuisance was superficial, without merit and did not even begin to 
provide the basis for summary judgment. 
IX. Summary judgment was not appropriate on the fact intensive 
determination of whether the "series of rolling moratoria" deprived the 
landowners of all economically beneficial use of their property. 
The trial court held that zoning regulations that protect the public welfare have 
generally been held not to be compensable takings. (R. at 2151.) The trial court denied the 
landowners' taking claims finding that the moratoria were legitimate legislative responses 
to a public welfare concern. This holding completely ignores Lucas and its explicit 
holding that a regulation denying all economically beneficial or productive use of land is a 
taking, even if it was for a legitimate public purpose. Id. at 2893. 
In Monterey 119 S.Ct. at 1644, the Supreme Court held that "the issue whether a 
landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a 
predominantly factual question . . . [and thus], this question is for the jury." Therefore, 
whether the moratoria deprived property owners of all economically viable use of their 
land is a question for the jury and cannot be decided on summary judgment when these 
issues hatve been put into dispute as in this case. The trial court entered findings of fact on 
disputed issues. 
other grave dangers to the lives and property of others. 
51 
X. Summary judgment was not appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county violated the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and § 1983. 
An action is arbitrary and capricious if it is "willful and unreasonable without 
consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case." Board of 
County Commissioner v. Teton County, 652 P.2d 400, 424 (Wyo. 1982). In tMs case, the 
history of the subdivision, the availability of information, and the actions of the county 
officials work to show that the county willfully disregarded the facts and circumstances 
related to Canyon Meadows and eliminated the statutory protections intended to protect 
the public. 
The landowners raised questions of fact as to whether or not the actions, of 
defendants were motivated by malice and bad faith. Some examples include: 
the facts that were used as a pretext for imposing the moratoria were known 
for years and not important until after personal offense was taken by Defendant 
Mathis (R. at 1261-60); 
Mathis instigated the moratorium on his own accord without direction from 
the county commission (R. at 1516-1512, 1508, 1504, 1501-1500); 
• the attempt to require a septic treatment plant that was retaliation against 
Victor Orvis (R. at 1257, 883-882); 
• the lack of similar restrictions and moratoria in Timber Lakes (R. at 1069); 
• reducing the area of the moratoria so as to only limit Canyon Meadows 
while excluding areas around and below the subdivision (R. at 1258); 
the admission that the county never thought there was movement, even 
though Mathis identified actual movement as the basis for the special treatment (R. 
at 1055); 
the harassment of Canyon Meadows certified percolation tester (R. at 1073-
1069); 
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• the express statements of Commissioners Duke and Kohler against a 
representative of the property owners (R. at 1439-1438, 1369); 
Defendant Wright's insistence on using ground water data that was shown to 
be patently faulty (R. at 1437-1436); and, 
• treating a small roadside cut as the general slope angle to prevent a septic 
system after it had passed testings (R. at 1110-1110). 
The list could go on for several more paragraphs. Viewing these items together 
reveals a pattern of conduct that should be submitted to a jury to determine whether or not 
the defendants were motivated by malice when they violated the landowners' rights. 
In Spence v Zimmerman. 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that a 
regulation that is pretextual and based on improper motive is a constitutional violation. 
The landowners' substantive due process claims arise out of malice and ill will in 
intentionally targeting Canyon Meadows with ordinances that eliminated all reasonable 
economic value. The landowners' complaint, the affidavits, and evidence raise material 
questions of fact as to the intent and pretextual nature of the county actions. Furthermore, 
the U. S. Supreme Court confirmed that equal protection claims may be brought by a class 
of one where a plaintiff alleges he has been intentionally treated differently from others 
similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in the treatment. Village 
ofWillowbrookv. Olech. 528 U.S. 562 at 564 (2000). 
The landowners have alleged disparate treatment and that this treatment is based on 
ill will and malice, and the very purpose of the equal protection clause is to "secure every 
person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, 
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whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through 
duly constituted agents." Id. at 564. 
A. Defendants actions are "conscience shocking." 
The "Due Process Clause's protection against 'conscience shocking' conduct 
traditionally only involved deliberately wrongful government decisions rather than merely 
negligent government conduct." (Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573 (10th Cir. 1995). 
"[T]he 'shock the conscience' standard requires a high level of outrageousness, because 
the Supreme Court has specifically admonished that a substantive due process violation 
requires more than an ordinary tort..." Id. 
It has been alleged that the county acted out of personal malice towards Victor 
Orvis and the Canyon Meadows landowners, all members of an identifiable group. It has 
been alleged that the county intended to cause harm, or at the very least the intent to cause 
an unreasonable risk of hardship to the landowners. It is shocking to think of government 
officials using their office to pursue personal grudges to the extent they ignore clear 
constitutional principals of due process and equal protection. The defendants' actions 
clearly rise above the level of ordinary tort, and, taken in total constitutes "conscience 
shocking" behavior. 
B. Defendants treated landowners differently from others similarly situated. 
The county's actions singled out the landowners and treated them differently than 
other similarly situated areas, such as Timber Lakes. (R. at 1493-1492.) The county 
claims that because the soil types in Canyon Meadows and Timber Lakes are not identical, 
there is nothing similar about the two areas, or the individuals living in the two areas. The 
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law does not require identical exactness between groups, it only requires similarity in 
relevant respects. Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital 345 F.3d 1157,1179 (10th 
Cir. 2003). Tom Hicken, the county certified percolation tester, testified that the Timber 
Lakes soil, like soil in Canyon Meadows, did not percolate well and that if the same 
standards were applied in both locations, Timber Lakes lots would not pass the tests. (R. at 
1069.) Furthermore, the issue of whether or not Canyon Meadows and Timber Lakes are 
similar enough to justify a finding of equal protection violations based on the disparate 
treatment is a question of fact that should be answered by a jury, not on summary 
judgment. 
XI. Summary judgment was not appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county was barred by 
the doctrine of zoning estoppel from enforcing the rolling moratoria. 
Judge Taylor ruled that estoppel cannot be asserted against a government agency 
unless the following special circumstances exist (R . at 2148-2147): 
[W]here the interests of justice mandate an exception to the general 
rule. In cases where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is whether it 
appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to 
be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. And in case 
there is doubt on such matters, it should be resolved in favor of permitting 
the party to have a trial on the issue, as opposed to summary rejection 
thereof. Elhers & Elhers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2nd 789, 792 
(Utah App. 1991) 
In this case, the injustice suffered by the Canyon Meadows landowners is sufficient 
to invoke the exception to the general rule prohibiting estoppel against the county. The 
landowners purchased their land with the sole purpose of building homes thereon and 
some landowners were told by county officials within weeks of purchase that building was 
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okay. After several homes were built with little or no county interference, the county 
began a deluge of policies, and defendants engaged in stringent enforcement of those 
policies, which halted development for years, cost the landowners tens of thousands of 
dollars in attempting to comply with the regulations, and reduced the property value of 
their land. Such animosity was directed specifically against Canyon Meadows. 
XII. Summary judgment was not appropriate where landowners raised 
questions of fact on the issue of whether or not the county defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity onfy shields 
officials "from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been 
thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). To measure this the court must determine whether 
or not the defendants' actions violated a "clearly established law." Dill v. City of Edmund, 
155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998). The law is considered "clearly established when it 
is well developed enough to inform the reasonable official that his conduct violates the 
law." Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992). This requires "a Supreme 
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority 
from other courts must have found the law to be as Plaintiff maintains. " Medina v. City 
and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). However, "precise factual 
correlation between the then-existing law and the case at-hand is not required." Snell v. 
Tunnell 920 F.2d 673, 699 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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A. Defendants violated clearly established laws and constitutional rights. 
In the present case, it is alleged the defendants violated landowners' rights under 
the constitutions of the United States and Utah through regulatory and physical takings 
and rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
The plainly established laws are as follows. 
First English Evangelical 107 S.Ct. at 2388, articulates the law on temporary 
takings; 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419 (1982), establishes 
the law as to physical takings cases with similar facts to the present case; 
Village of Euclid et al. v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), 
establishes that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional if its "provisions are clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare." As argued above, the malicious intent and the lack of 
legitimate evidence render the county's actions arbitrary and unreasonable; 
Lindon City v. Engineers Constr Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981), and Brendle v. 
City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Ct. App. 1997), sets forth the requirements of procedural 
due process and putting the defendants on notice; 
In Hennagir v. Utah Dept. Of Corrections, Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1579611, page 8 
(D. Utah, 2006), citing Buckley Const., Inc., v. Shawnee Civic & Cultural Deve. Auth, 
933 F. 2d 853, 859 (10th Cir. 1991), the court made it clear that "[t]he Equal Protection 
clause is 'triggered when the government treats someone differently than another who is 
similarly situated.'" 
As a result of these facts as well as the law as established by the mentioned cases, 
the county officials were most definitely on reasonable notice that their actions would 
have, and did, violate the landowners' procedural due process rights. 
B. The individual defendants are not immune from their own malicious acts. 
The individual defendants are not immune from liability for their own malicious 
acts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(b) states that: 
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A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding 
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: (I) the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
The facts as outlined above raise questions of fact as to the individual defendant's 
intent and malice towards the landowners, but again it is noteworthy that only those who 
had criticized Mr. Mathis were included in open-ended Moratorium 97-13. 
Qualified immunity provides "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law." Ambus, 858 P.2d at 1378. The issue of qualified 
immunity "turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action." Id. In this case, all 
the evidence, bolstered by the testimony of numerous individuals, demonstrates that 
defendants knowingly engaged in conduct against the landowners in violation of their 
fundamental property rights. At least two objective individuals, Tom Hicken and Peter M. 
DeJong, stated the county's actions were motivated primarily by personal animus against 
Mr. Orvis, and not on any legitimate soil testing standards or other state concerns. These 
affidavits and the other evidence presented create a question of fact as to whether the 
county officers knowingly violated the law. 
ISSUES CONCERNING ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
XIII. The trial court erred in compelling lay parties to respond to written 
interrogatories asking the lay parties to "specifically identify the clearly 
established law" violated by the county, especially since the parties 
identified the laws violated after objecting that it called for a legal 
opinion. 
The lower court awarded defendants $3,500 on a motion to compel discovery 
responses. An award of attorneys fees is unjust when "an impartial observer would agree 
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that a party had a good reason to withhold discovery," Brown v. Iowa, 152 F.R.D. 168, 
173 (S.D. Iowa 1993). The committee comments on the discovery rules expressly state 
that Fed. R. Civil Pro. Rule 33 "may not extend to issues of 'pure law,' i.e. legal issues 
unrelated to the facts of a case." See Fed. R. Civil Pro. 33(b) advisory committees note. 
The county's discovery made several requests for lay witnesses to give legal 
conclusions. For example twice the interrogatories requested lay witnesses to 
"specifically identify the clearly established law" and to "specifically identify the 
constitutional rights" that defendants violated and to identify specific constitutional 
provisions. (R. at 2573-2572.) Further, the county asked the lay witnesses to identify the 
test standard laws defendants should have applied in Canyon Meadows. Id. 
The home owners objected to such requests because they asked for legal 
conclusions, but nevertheless answered these interrogatories, pointing out the legal issues 
had been argued extensively in the parties' first motions for summary judgment. (R. at 
2509-2507.) Nevertheless, the court compelled the responses, and ordered the 
landowners to pay $3,500 in attorneys fees. 
XIV, The trial court erred in dismissing landowners that were designated in 
the complaint as "John Does" but who were specifically identified in 
discovery responses to the county by name and by the lot they owned in 
the subdivision. 
Over the course of this litigation, numerous complaints were filed, each identifying 
various lot owners in the Canyon Meadows subdivision as "John Does." This was done 
purely in the interests of judicial economy as many of the homes and lots in Canyon 
Meadows changed ownership during the course of the protracted litigation, thus avoiding 
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the necessity of having to amend the complaint every time a home was sold and a new 
land owner became an interest party. Due to the sheer number of landowners in Canyon 
Meadows, and because of the size and complexity of this case, the use of John Doe 
plaintiffs served a valuable function in keeping litigation costs down on both sides, in 
greatly reducing the number of motions coming before the court. 
Regardless, the county has known the identities of the John Doe plaintiffs 
throughout this entire case. First, on December 9, 1998, in responses to defendants' 
discovery request, the John Doe plaintiffs were expressly identified, giving the lots they 
owned or lived on, and the values of those lots or homes. (R. at 2764-2759)(Addendum 
56-61.) Further, the county took the depositions of many of the John Doe plaintiffs in 
1998 and 1999 wherein they stated under oath that they were John Doe plaintiffs. (R. at 
2758-2740.) No prejudice to the county resulted from this action. 
Further, the court should make every effort to insure that the proceeding adjudicates 
the rights of those necessary and intended to be before court, in accordance with 17(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. In Intermountain Physical Medical Associates v. 
Micro-Dex Corp, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1987), the lower court dismissed plaintiffs case 
with prejudice because the named plaintiff was in fact a partnership made up of three 
P.C.'s not named as parties to the suit. The Utah appeals court held that the lower court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the case, and held that the court should have allowed 
the plaintiffs to amend the complaint instead. Id. at 1133. The court also stated that the 
"defendant claimed no surprise, nor could it, but instead relied on the specter of increased 
costs and complexity if the amendment was granted." 
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Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically prohibits dismissal of a 
case for failure to name a real party in interest. The rule reads in relevant part (emphasis 
added): 
. . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, 
or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
In dismissing the Joe Doe plaintiffs the court failed to point to any prejudice to the 
county other than increased liability. The real prejudice was to all the plaintiffs who were 
dismissed even though their identities were known and they participated in the litigation 
for nearly a decade. The court rejected the suggestion that in the alternative leave should 
be granted to amend the complaint to name the John Doe plaintiffs, simply stating that the 
court would have to consider that if a separate motion was filed. Such a motion was filed, 
but never ruled upon since the court granted the county's second motion for summary 
judgment. 
XV. In light of the "stringent" standard that attorney's fees should only 
rarely be awarded to defendants and only when the plaintiffs § 1983 
claim is frivolous, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the 
county's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
After the dismissal of the last issues in this case, the county filed a motion for fees 
and expenses, and was awarded $74,319.71. The lower court's order of attorneys fees is an 
abuse of discretion for five reasons. 
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A. The lower court used an erroneous legal standard. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing party may be awarded reasonable fees and 
expenses in a § 1983 case only if as stated in Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 848, 853-
854 (10th Cir. 1980): 
the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the 
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so . . . The applicable 
standard in ascertaining whether a fee should be awarded to a defendant 
depends on whether the action is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for 
harassment purposes." 
In that case, the court stated that lower courts' decisions have been overturned when the 
"District Court 'made no effort to determine whether the lawsuit was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.'" Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has described the legal standard as "stringent," and stated 
fees should rarely be awarded to prevailing defendants. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-
15 (1980). Further, the 10th Circuit has stated: "This is a difficult standard to meet, to the 
point that rarely will a case be sufficiently frivolous to justify imposing attorney fees on 
the plaintiff." Mitchell v. City of Moore., Okla, 218 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000). In 
determining whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney's fees, the district court 
must focus on the question of whether the case is seriously lacking in any arguable merit. 
See Walker v. Nationsbank 53 F.3d 1548, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Hughes v. Regents of 
University of Colorado. 967 F.Supp. 431, 440 (D. Colo. 1996). 
An award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A 
court abuses its discretion if its fee award is based on an inaccurate view of the law or a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact. Ihler v. Chisholm. 995 P.2d 439 (Mont. 2000), Jane L. v. 
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Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, the trial court never found that the 
landowners' case was "clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes" 
nor that the landowners' case was "seriously lacking in any arguable merit." Instead, the 
court applied a much lower standard, stating that "Plaintiffs knew or should have known . . 
that they had insufficient factual grounds upon which to succeed on their remaining 
claims.. ."(R . at 3967.) That language is an erroneous and much lower legal standard 
than the "stringent" and "difficult" one required by U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and by the 
courts. The lower court abused its discretion by awarding the county $74,319.71 under an 
erroneous and much less stringent legal standard than that which is required. Therefore, 
this court should apply the proper legal standard, overturn the lower court's order, and 
hold that the county is not entitled to fees. 
B. The property owners' made no concession that their remaining claims were 
frivolous or meritless. 
"Even if the law or the facts are somewhat questionable or unfavorable at the outset 
of litigation, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit." Hughes v. 
Rowe, 449 U.S. at 15, citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC. 434 U.S. 412, 421 
(1978). In that case, the trial court dismissed all plaintiffs civil rights claims except one 
and awarded the defendant attorney's fees. The Supreme Court held (Id): 
Despite the lower court's conclusion to the contrary, the allegations of petitioner's 
amended complaint are definitely not meritless in the Christiansburg sense. Even 
those allegations that were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim deserved 
and received the careful consideration of both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals. Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove legally insufficient to 
require a trial are not, for that reason alone, "groundless" or "without foundation" 
as required by Christiansburg. 
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Here the court order states that "Plaintiffs ultimately conceded they had 
insufficient grounds for their remaining claims . . . " as a basis for the order for fees. (R. at 
3966.) First, the landowners made no such concession. Landowners stated at the hearing 
that because much of the evidence had been made unavailable due to the partial summary 
judgment, it didn't make sense to participate in a lengthy and expensive trial that would 
ultimately have little or no impact on the outcome of the case. (R. at 3707.) Landowners 
stated also that their response to the county's second motion for summary judg;ment was 
the best record landowners could present with the limited evidence and facts available to 
them. Id. Those statements were made for the purpose of moving the case into the 
appeals stage quickly after landowners had established an adequate record. Those 
statements were not an admission that their claims were now meritless. 
The so-called "concessions" were merely that the landowners remaining claims 
were "insufficient to require a trial" and are not "for that reason alone, 'groundless' or 
'without foundation' as required by Christiansburg." Id. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 15. 
The lower court has punished the landowners for vigorously preserving their remaining 
claims after the ruling on the first motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the lower 
court abused its discretion and its ruling should be overturned. 
C. The lower court engaged in erroneous post hoc reasoning. 
In deciding whether attorneys fees are warranted, a district court should resist the 
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning to conclude that, because a plaintiff did not 
ultimately prevail, the action must have been frivolous. In Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 
421, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: 
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To take the further step of assessing attorney's fees against landowners simply 
because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in 
most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous 
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. 
In this case, Paragraph 4 of the order states that fees were awarded because 
"Defendants have prevailed on all claims brought by landowners in this case." (R . at 
3916.) In other words, the court awarded the fees because landowners did not prevail. 
The court's order is based onpost hoc reasoning in violation of Christiansburg, and is an 
abuse of discretion and should be overturned. 
D. The landowners' efforts before the trial court were for the purpose of 
curtailing litigation, and were not brought for harassment purposes. 
'The applicable standard in ascertaining whether a fee should be awarded to a 
defendant depends on whether the action is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for 
harassment purposes." Prochaska. Here, landowners endeavored to prevent litigation 
before the trial court. After the first partial summary judgment, the landowners 
immediately petitioned for an interlocutory appeal to prevent unnecessary litigation on the 
few remaining claims. (R . at 2226.) Unfortunately, that petition was denied and the 
landowners had no choice but to preserve their few remaining claims for appeal. The 
landowners were faced with the choice of giving up on their remaining claims, or 
responding to discovery and numerous motions from the county in order to present the full 
case on appeal. Once an adequate record was established, the landowners stated that a 
trial on 10% of the evidence was a waste of judicial resources. The landowners' actions 
below were not considered "vexatious" or "brought for harassment purposes." On the 
contrary, the landowners' actions demonstrate that their intent was to preserve their 
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claims, make a record, and get to this court as soon as possible so a trial could be held on 
all relevant evidence. Therefore, the court's order for attorney's fees should be reversed. 
E. Landowners' remaining claims below were supported by facts and cannot be 
considered "meritless." 
All of the landowners' claims were well supported by facts, including those claims 
remaining after the first partial summary judgment, as demonstrated in the statement of 
facts contained herein. Therefore, the landowners' remaining claims cannot be considered 
"meritless" or "seriously lacking in any arguable merit." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 15. 
The landowners presented an extensive line of facts supporting their remaining claims— all 
of which were supported by geotechnical studies and reports, Wasatch County 
correspondence, reports, and notices, deposition testimony, minutes from the Wasatch 
County Board of Commissioners, previous court documents, and numerous affidavits. 
Regardless of the reduced facts available to the landowners, all of the remaining claims 
were independently supported. Such an order is a clear abuse of discretion, and should be 
overturned. 
XVI. Request for attorney's fees. 
Landowners have claimed attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). This federal provision permits an award 
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983 and other sections of the civil rights title. Therefore, upon prevailing, the 
landowners should be entitled to their attorney's fees in bringing this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The landowners ask for the following 20 affirmative rulings or conclusions of law 
from this court. 
1. In light of First English Evangelical's holding that "temporary takings which . . . 
deny a landowner all use of his property are no different in kind from permanent 
takings, for which the constitution clearly requires compensation/' the trial court 
erred when it found "as a matter of law that a land-use regulation that is by its terms 
temporary, meaning finite in duration, is not a taking." 
2. It is a physical taking when a county enters on private land with heavy 
equipment and drills and installs permanent monitoring wells, all without the 
consent of the landowner. 
3. The trial court erred when it dismissed the landowners' claims that the "series of 
rolling moratoria" were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. 
4. When § 17-27-404(2) stated that a county commission "shall establish a period 
of limited effect for the temporary ordinances not to exceed six months," the county 
acted illegally when it imposed "a series of rolling moratoria" that exceeded six 
months. 
5. When § 17-27-404(l)(c) says that a moratorium "may not impose . . . [a] 
financial requirement on building or development," the county acted illegally when 
it passed a "series of rolling moratoria" that prohibited all building unless the 
landowners spent almost $50,000 on testing. 
6. In light of Call which held that ordinances adopted without public notice are 
void ab initio, the county acted illegally when it adopted a moratorium ordinance 
without giving any notice that it would be acting on such an ordinance at a public 
meeting. 
7. When § 17-27-403(l)(b) stated that a county commission "may not make any 
amendment" to the land use code without first submitting the amendment "to the 
planning commission for its approval, disapproval or recommendations," the 
county acted illegally when it passed a moratorium ordinance that had not been 
submitted first to the planning commission. 
8. When § 26A-1-121(1)( c) stated that the health department "shall provide public 
hearings prior to the adoption of any regulation or standard," the county acted 
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illegally when it adopted numerous regulations on septic field installation without 
holding public hearings. 
9. In light of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the "right of the 
people . . . to petition the government for redress/' the county acted illegally when 
it cut off citizens' rights to speak with elected and appointed officials simply 
because those citizens filed suit against the county. 
The landowners ask that this court reverse the rulings of the trial court that were 
based on disputed material facts that the trial court incorrectly determined in a summary 
judgment motion. Specifically the landowners ask that the following determinations be 
allowed to go to the jury: 
10. whether or not the moratoria "substantially advance[d] a legitimate state 
interest," or "compelling, countervailing public interest." 
11. whether the county had ulterior motives, bad faith, or malice in adopting the 
rolling moratoria; 
12. whether the "series of rolling moratoria" were justified on the theory of 
nuisance; 
13. whether the "series of rolling moratoria" deprived the landowners of all 
economically beneficial use of their property; 
14. whether or not the county violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses and § 1983; 
15. whether or not the county was barred by the doctrine of zoning estoppel from 
enforcing the rolling moratoria; 
16. whether or not the county defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
The landowners ask this court to find that the trial court abused its discretion on the 
following three issues. 
17. The trial court abused its discretion in compelling lay parties to respond to 
written interrogatories asking the lay parties to "specifically identify the clearly 
established law" violated by the county, especially since the parties identified the 
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laws violated after objecting that it called for a legal opinion, and in awarding 
attorneys fees against the landowner. 
18. The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing landowners that were 
designated in the complaint as "John Does" but who were specifically identified in 
discovery responses to the county by name and by the lot they owned in the 
subdivision. 
19. In light of the "stringenf' standard that attorney's fees should only rarely be 
awarded to defendants and only when the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is frivolous, the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting the county's motion for attorney's fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
20. Lastly, the landowners ask that they be awarded their attorney fees for the cost 
of bringing this appeal. 
DATED this -> Q day of September 2006 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
GORDON DUVAL 
BRIAN K. HAWS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
John and Olga Gardner, et al., 
Appellants, 
vs. 
Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch 
County, a legislative body, et al. 
Appellees. 
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Case No. 20051110-SC 
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I certify that on this r>Q , day of September 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy the 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT and the Appellants' APPLICATION TO FILE AN OVER-
LENGTH BRIEF, along with copies of the forgoing certificate of service to be mailed, postage 
prepaid addressed as follows: 
Craig V. Wentz 
Barton H. Kunz II 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
DATED this QO day of September 2006. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
^frx-JArn C/t-uoz^A 
Gordon W. Duval 
Brian K. Haws 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Addendum 
Mr. Randall R. Park, P.E. June 3, 1994 
Project Manager, District Six 
Utah Department of Transportation 
825 North 900 West 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Dear Randy: 
Thank you for your letter of May 10, 1994. 
I was saddened to learn that you feel there is no way across the Hoover Slide area 
except across the meadow, which would impact the Canyon Meadows project. 
jThe meadow is a "beautiful place and represents an almost hidden resource where 
these homes are located which is isolated from most views of human habitation. 
I was alarmed about your estimates that the whole area is moving about three 
quarters of an inch to the east every six months. — ^U)^r^y^ /Sy - 3c" 
You asked whether or not the developer could develop his 160 units. It is unlikely 
that all 160 units could be developed in the area. My understanding with the 
current developer is that he thought units would stop at somewhere near 100 to 120 
units. However, he intends to get everything he can get approved. 
There is a serious problem about septic tanks in the area. The soil is so tight that 
the Health Department has been denying building permits on some of the lots. It 
may be that as many as half of the remaining lots will have problems getting septic 
tanks approved. 
I do not know how to calculate the relation between these septic tanks and the 
slide, but there is nothing in our County ordinance that allows us to consider this 
for existing development. New development would require an environmental 
impact statement and a new geotechnical survey. We could discuss this with you 
more fully if the man ever proposes anything new. If your people can show us a 
*M8 
Mr. Randall R. Park Page Two June 3, 1994 
direct relationship between septic tanks and slide movement, we could either make 
requirements to mitigate it; or if that were not possible, we could disallow the lots. 
Since I do not have anything to judge right now, I cannot draw any conclusions. 
For your information, there are presently 84 of the 160 units now approved by the 
County with seven existing homes and four units in two duplexes now existing on 
the property. 
Your letter seems to indicate that if the 70 units already approved were allowed to 
be built it will affect the stability of your road. 
I am also concerned about whether or not the septic tanks from these 70 units will 
accelerate development to where the area becomes structurally unsound. 
I understand from Commissioner Coleman that the upper variation through the 
Meadow is something that the Commission could support since they want the road 
to be as stable as is possible. 
I am sorry this not more helpful, but it is all that I know for now. 
Sincerely, 
Robert A. Mathis 
Wasatch County Planner 
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Ffi'LED 
Fourth Judiciai District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN and OLGA GARDNER; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOARD of COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of 
WASATCH COUNTY; et al, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: March 5, 2002 
Case Number. 990401676 
Division V: Judge James R Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions to reconsider. Both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants are asking the Court to reconsider portions of its decision dated June 21, 2001, which 
addressed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
Defendants cross-motion for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. The Court's 
findings and reasoning will be discussed below. 
The Utah Supreme Court has given the court the following guidelines for making a ruling 
of summary judgment: 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) quoting5ow>e?7 v. Riverion City, 656 
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Page 1 of 11 
•M-\rM?MnTTM ? Or : 
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contain this rule for making a ruling of 
summary judgment: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The Court again applies these standards to the facts and arguments presented in support of the 
cross-motions for reconsideration now before it. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case involves a development within Wasatch County in Provo Canyon described as 
"Canyon Meadows," together with the surrounding area. Some or all of the development is 
located on an area where there has been dispute regarding slope stability and the suitability of the 
area for building and especially for septic systems. This suit challenges the restrictions and/or 
requirements for issuing building permits imposed at various times by the Wasatch County 
Commission. 
DISCUSSION 
I. PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
A. Regulatory Taking 
In the decision referenced above, the Court ruled that the challenged ordinances did not 
effect a taking of Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs argue that this finding was improper because there 
was a dispute of fact regarding slope stability when the ordinance was enacted and because the 
Court failed to properly apply the test established by the Supreme Court in order to determine 
whether or not a regulatory taking has occurred. Further, Plaintiffs argue that application of the 
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test requires a finding of fact more properly presented to the jury The Court finds otherwise and 
reaffirms its earlier decision. 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council the Supreme court stated, "the Fifth 
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' 505 U.S 1003, 1016 (1992) 
(citations omitted). This was a reiteration of the test used to determine if regulatory actions rise 
to the level of a compensable taking, and it is the test applied by this Court in reaching this 
decision. 
1 Legitimate State Interest 
The Court finds that at the time the challenged ordinances were enacted there was no 
factual dispute that the slope stability of the Canyon Meadows area was in question The facts 
presented indicate that neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants knew for sure how stable the slope was, 
or how well the area was suited for construction of additional structures and septic units In 
response to the question of stability, the county implemented a moratorium on building in the 
Canyon Meadows area until the these questions could be answered. 
The Court makes no finding regarding whether or not the area was stable and/or suitable 
for further development, nor does it need to The Supreme Court has stated that land-use 
regulation violates the fifth amendment, and effects a taking, when it fails to substantially advance 
legitimate state interests. See id It is not necessary for this Court to determine whether or not 
the slope was actually stable in order to determine that Defendants were acting to advance a 
legitimate state interest. The fact that there was an undisputed question regarding slope stability, 
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which related to the health and safety of Wasatch County residents, gave Defendants a legitimate 
state interest, perhaps even a duty, to act as they did. 
Later cases have further defined the concept of legitimate state action. The Supreme 
Court implemented a "reasonable relationship" or "rough proportionality" requirement mDolan 
v. City ofTigard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). This requirement means that not only must a state act in 
furtherance of a legitimate state interest, but it must also show that the action it takes is 
reasonably related to the public interest it is seeking to advance. This Court finds as a matter of 
law that in the present case the moratoria implemented by Defendants are directly related to the 
legitimate public safety interest that was called into question by additional development of the 
Canyon Meadows area. 
Plaintiffs argue that the determination of "rough proportionality" is a question of fact for 
the jury, and they refer the Court to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Monterrey v. Del 
Monte Dunes^ 526 U.S. 687 (1998). However, the decision in Del Monte Dunes does not require 
a jury determination of this question; it merely notes that the question is a mixed question of fact 
and law that may be presented to a jury in certain circumstances. See id. at 721. 
2. Loss of Economic Viability 
Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that the second prong of a takings analysis requires the 
Court to determine if the government action, even if it does advance a legitimate state interest, 
denies all economically beneficial uses of the land in question. Such a denial would constitute a 
taking. Lucas describes the denial of economically viable land-use as "the rare situation where the 
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses." 505 U.S. at 1018 
(emphasis added). 
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This concept has been explored, and clarified in many Supreme Court Decisions. Plaintiffs 
themselves have cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
In that case the Supreme Court found that no taking had occurred because there were still some 
economically viable uses for the property in question despite the fact that a city regulation 
drastically limited the property's uses. See generally id. 
In order to determine the loss of economic viability, it is important to know how property 
is to be viewed in a takings analysis. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedectis, states: 
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a 
taking, this Court focuses rather . . on the nature of the interference with rights in 
the parcel as a whole 480 U.S 470, 497(1987)(citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court further clarified this point stating that "where an owner possesses a full 
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not a taking because the 
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id. In Keystone, government regulations required coal 
in certain areas to be left unmined in order to prevent the surface area above the coal deposits 
from collapsing. The plaintiffs argued that the government had effectively "taken" the coal that 
had to be left behind and they sought compensation. The Supreme Court refused to carve the 
property into smaller physical sections for the focus of the takings analysis insisting, rather, that 
the property be viewed as a whole in order to determine if the regulation had precluded all 
economically beneficial use. It is clear to this Court that in order to find a taking has occurred it 
must find that the owner's entire "bundle" of rights has been affected, leaving no economically 
viable option to the owner. 
The present case involves temporary moratoria which affected the permis<>ible uses of the 
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Canyon Meadows property for a finite period of time. Plaintiffs argue that during that finite time 
period, there were no economically beneficial uses available to them which effected a total taking 
of their property for which they must be compensated. The Court disagrees. The Court finds as a 
matter of law that a land-use regulation that is by its terms temporary, meaning finite in duration, 
is not a taking. 
To find that this type of regulation is a taking would require the Court to carve out and 
focus on a narrow portion of the entire bundle of rights available to a land owner. Unlike 
Keystone, the division would not be a physical parceling of the land in question, but a time 
sensitive division of present and future rights available to fee simple land owners. The Court finds 
that the potential future uses of property, which have not yet been foreclosed by a temporary 
regulation, provide value and economic viability to land affected by such regulations. In so 
finding, the Court finds the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency persuasive. See generally 216 F. 3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000). 
In the present case, Defendants enacted moratoria under §17-27-404 of the Utah Code. 
Accordingly, the Court has determined that following §17-27-404 the ordinances were valid for a 
finite time period of six months. Neither ordinance 97-1 nor 97-13 could control the permitted 
uses of the Canyon Meadows properties any later than six months after they became effective. 
The economically viable, future uses that remained available to these properties gave value to the 
land and preclude any finding that a taking occurred 
Plaintiffs argue that First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 
requires compensation for temporary takings. While this is true, the Court finds First English to 
be procedurally distinct from the case at bar. First English addressed the remedies available once 
Page 6 of 11 
a taking was determined, and it required compensation for takings that are rendered temporary by 
government actions beyond the terms of the regulatory action itself See generally 482 U.S. 304 
(1987) It did not address regulations that are by their own nature temporary, furthermore, the 
case was remanded for a determination of whether or not Los Angeles County's actions, which 
prevented the development of property in a flood plain, were takings at all. See generally id. 
Of course it is possible to conceive of a regulation that purports to be temporary, but in 
fact is not so. Obviously, a regulation merely masquerading as a temporary regulation could enact 
a taking. However, the Court need not consider this situation at this time. 
3. Nuisance 
It should be noted that even in the event that a regulation does prohibit all economically 
beneficial use of land, the government can escape compensation if the regulation does no more 
than prohibit a common law nuisance. See generally Lucas at 1029-32. The Lucas Court stated: 
A law or decree with such an effect [the deprivation of all economically beneficial 
uses] mus t . . . do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved 
in the courts - by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under 
the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power 
to abate nuisances that affect the public generally. Id. at 1029. 
In other words, a state may use land-use regulation to abate nuisances as long as it does not go 
beyond the remedies that would be available to it in a nuisance tort action. 
The Court makes no finding regarding the existence of a nuisance in this case. However, 
it is noted that Defendants actions appear to be in the vein of abating a potential nuisance, and it 
appears to the Court that Defendants, as required by Lucas, would likely be able to identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the same uses proscribed by 
ordinances 97-1 and 91-13. See Lucas at 1031-32. 
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B. Procedural Validity of Ordinance 97-1 
Plaintiffs challenge the validity of ordinance 97-] under the Utah Open Public Meetings 
Act (OPMA), Utah Code Ann. §52-4-6, because ordinance 97-1 was not on the agenda of 
meeting where it was adopted. The Court finds that temporary regulations enacted under §17-27-
404 are specific exceptions to the notice required by the OPMA, in order to deal with urgent 
matters of compelling public interest. Also, §52-4-6(5) relieves public bodies of the notice 
requirements of §52-4-6(2) in urgent circumstances. Thus, the Court finds that ordinance 97-1 is 
valid under both §52-4-6 and § 17-27-404. Further, as noted in the Court's previous decision, 
Plaintiffs' challenge to this valid ordinance was not made within 30 days of the local decision and 
is therefore untimely. 
n . DEFENDANTS5 CROSS-MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Defendants cross-motion to reconsider asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' §1983 claims 
against Defendants Mathis and Wright as individuals. As noted above the Court grants this 
motion in part and denies it in part. 
A. Defendant Mathis 
According to Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to Defendants' cross-motion to 
reconsider, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Mathis (Mathis) are based on the following 
allegations: 1) that Mathis maliciously drafted ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 in response tp Plaintiffs' 
complaints regarding his administration of the Wasatch County Planning department; 2) that 
Mathis kept secret from Plaintiffs the fact that he was drafting ordinance 97-1, despite the fact 
that he was meeting directly with Canyon Meadows property owners during the same time he was 
drafting the ordinance; and 3) that Mathis improperly enforced both ordinance 97-1 and ordinance 
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97-13 after their six month terms had expired. (It should be noted that the third allegation is not 
contained in Plaintiffs' opposition briefing, but was asserted during oral argument.) 
The Court finds that Mathis is immune from suit with respect to Plaintiffs first two 
allegations. The Court finds that drafting proposed ordinances is a legislative action for which 
Mathis is granted immunity. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' cannot be injured by proposed legislation 
that is of no effect unless enacted by the county commissioners, and Mathis had no duty to inform 
the public that he was drafting a proposed law that had not yet been submitted for approval and 
that may or may not ever be adopted. Accordingly the Court grants summary judgment for 
Defendants with respect to these specific allegations 
However, with respect to Plaintiffs' final allegation against Mathis, that he improperly 
enforced the moratorium, the Court is unable to grant summary judgment, and Defendants' 
motion is denied with respect to this point Although the factual support in the record is 
somewhat vague, there are factual allegations, specifically from Plaintiff Orvis, that the 
moratorium was enforced even when the ordinances were without legal effect. Even though the 
evidence appears sparse, when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party the 
Court concludes that it would be improper to grant summary judgment on this issue. A genuine 
dispute of material fact exists that would require the Court to weigh the evidence before it in 
order to determine if Mathis did or did not act properly. 
B. Defendant Wright 
Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendant Wright (Wright) are as follows: 1) that Wright 
improperly required Plaintiffs to do percolation tests at a depth of 4f10"; and 2) that Wright is 
arbitrarily requiring test of a certain quality and age only for Canyon Meadows properties. 
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First, the Court grants summary judgment for Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs' first 
allegation The propriety of requiring percolation tests at a depth of 4,]0U was previously decided 
in another court An action for the same claim was dismissed with prejudice on December 22, 
2000 Res judicata precludes this Court from reexamining the issue 
However, a summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiffs' second allegation is not proper 
There are some facts in the record which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
may indicate irregularities in the acceptance of Canyon Meadows percolation tests Again, a 
determination of whether or not Wright's actions were improper would require the Court to 
weigh the evidence related to this dispute of fact Accordingly, Defendants' motion is denied with 
respect to Plaintiffs' second allegation 
CONCLUSION 
This Court finds that both ordinance 97-1 and ordinance 97-13 were validly enacted, and 
that the moratoria imposed by these ordinances did not effect a compensable taking of Plaintiffs' 
property Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied Defendants' cross-motion 
for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part as outlined above Counsel for 
Defendants to prepare an order in accordance with this decision .
 rW , .^ 
A certificate of mailing is attached. 
Copies of this Decision mailed to 
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Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Gordon W. Duval 
Brian K. Haws 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84602 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Craig V. Wentz 
Barton H. Kunz II 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Mailed this J y day of [ I QJL^L-^2002, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Court Clerk 1 
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Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 
I 9 1 - J 
ORDINANCE NO. 97 - 1 
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING TEMPORARY ZONING RULES AND 
RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE CANYON 
MEADOWS AREA OF WASATCH COUNTY FOR SIX MONTHS PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 17-27-4 04. 
WHEREAS, Canyon Meadows is a mountain subdivision located in 
the Provo Canyon area of Wasatch County that has been in 
existence for approximately25 years; and 
WHEREAS, the Canyon Meadows subdivision was originally 
approved based on a plan for individual septic tanks for 
wastewater treatment; and 
WHEREAS, groundwater problems have recently been, noted in' 
the Canyon Meadows subdivision; and 
WHEREAS, several of the lots recently sold in the Canyon 
Meadows subdivision have not been able to pass percolation 
and other tests necessary to conclusively determine the 
effectiveness and safety of septic tanks on those lots; and 
WHEREAS, the'County is unable to issue building permits for 
lots where it has not been conclusively establish that the 
septic tank plan for the building will adequately and safely 
handle the wastewater from the building; and 
WHEREAS, County officials have legitimate and serious 
concerns that the hydrology and geology of the area where 
the Canyon Meadows subdivision is located may not be 
suitable for additional septic tanks or the continued use of 
existing septic tanks; and 
WHEREAS, the County has legitimate and serious concerns that 
the aggregate concentration of wastewater in the gound may 
have adverse affects on the geological stability of the 
region; 
WHEREAS, the County is aware that surrounding property 
owners also have plans to develop properties adjacent to the 
Canyon Meadows subdivision and that those plans are 
tentatively based on individual septic tanks for wastewater 
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t r e a t m e n t , which would f u r t h e r compound g r o u n d w a t e r and 
g e o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s , i f a n y , i n t h e a r e a ; a n d 
WHEREAS, t h e County has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t i s i n t h e b e s t 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e County and i t s r e s i d e n t s t o t e m p o r a r i l y 
su spend t h e s a l e of l o t s and t h e i s s u a n c e of b u i l d i n g 
p e r m i t s i n t h e Canyon Meadows s u b d i v i s i o n a r e a of Wasatch 
County u n t i l a comprehens ive s t u d y can be d o n e t o d e t e r m i n e 
t h e s a f e t y of t h e g e o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s of t h e a r e a , and t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e s u i t a b i l i t y of t h e a r e a of c o n t i n u e d 
d e v e l o p m e n t on i n d i v i d u a l s e p t i c t a n k s ; 
WHEREAS, t h e Board of County Commiss ioners o f Wasa t ch County 
f i n d s , f o r t h e above r e a s o n s , a c o m p e l l i n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g 
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t e x i s t s r e q u i r i n g t h a t t e m p o r a r y z o n i n g 
r e g u l a t i o n s be adop ted t o r e s t r i c t t he s a l e of l o t s as 
b u i l d i n g l o t s and t h e i s s u e a n c e of b u i l d i n g p e r m i t s a s s e t 
f o r t h h e r e i n . 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Temporary zoning r egu l a t i ons are hereby adopted which 
prohibi t acceptance or approval of appl ica t ions for bui lding 
permits r e q u i r i n g sept ic tanks and dra in f i e lds for sewage 
disposal in the Canyon Meadows area of Wasatch County. 
2. Temporary zoning r egu l a t i ons are hereby adopted which 
prohibi t acceptance of app l ica t ions for subdivis ion approvals 
which contemplate sept ic tanks and dra in f i e lds for sewage 
disposal on p rope r t i e s adjacent t o the Canyon Meadows subdivision 
of Wasatch County. 
3. Temporary zoning r e g u l a t i o n s are hereby adopted which 
prohibi t the s a l e of lo ts in the Canyon Meadows subdivis ion with 
the represen ta t ion that s ep t i c tanks are or w i l l be allowed, and 
without the express disclaimer informing the p r o s p e c t i v e buyer of 
t h i s ordinance. 
4. The temporary r egu la t ions adopted by t h i s Ordinance 
shal l be e f f ec t ive for a per iod of s i x months from the effective 
date of t h i s Ordinance. 
5. During the period while the temporary r egu la t ions are 
in effect , the s taf f of Wasatch County i s d i r e c t e d to prepare and 
1209 
conduct, or cause to be conducted, a comprehensive study the 
current and anticipated future state of the geology and 
groundwater in the area of the Canyon Meadows subdivision and" 
adjacent properties, and to produce a detailed report containing 
recommendations regarding the suitability of the continued use of 
existing septic tanks and drain fields in the Canyon Meadows 
subdivision, and the proposed use for future development of 
Beptic tanks and drain fields in the Canyon Meadows subdivision 
and surrounding areas. 
S. The provisions of this* Ordinance are severable If any 
provision of this Ordinance is found to be invalid, unlawful or 
unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
balance of the Ordinance shall be unaffected and continue in full 
force and effect. 
7. This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon 
signing and one publication in a newspaper having local 
circulation. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of 
Wasatch County, Utah, this / 3 ~ day of (Zs>^^ , 1997 -
WASATCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
1U& 
T^Lal&iN PROVOST 
KEiTH JACOBSJ
 y 
£&u+>^ ^?t'• 
SHARRON WINTERTON 
ATTEST: 
BRENT TITCOMB, COUNTY CLERK 
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ORDINANCE NO. 91 - Ob 
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING TEMPORARY ZONING RULES AND 
RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE CANYON 
MEADOWS AREA OF WASATCH COUNTY 
WHEREAS, Canyon Meadows is a mountain subdivision located in the Provo Canyon 
area of Wasatch County that has been in existence for approximately 25 years; and 
WHEREAS, the Canyon Meadows subdivision was originally approved based on a plan 
for individual septic tanks for wastewater treatment; and 
WHEREAS, on January 13, 1997, the Commission enacted Ordinance 97-1: (!) that 
prohibited the acceptance or approval of applications for building permits requiring sept' 
tanks for sewage disposal in the Canyon Meadows subdivision, (2) that prohibited 
acceptance of applications for subdivision approvals which contemplate septic tanks and 
drain fields for sewage disposal on properties adjacent to the Canyon Meadows 
subdivision of Wasatch County, and (3) that directed the staff of Wasatch County to 
prepare a comprehensive study of the suitability of the continued or future use of septic 
tanks and drain fields in the Canyon Meadows subdivision and surrounding areas and of 
the geological stability of the Canyon Meadows subdivision and surrounding areas. A 
copy of Ordinance 97-1 is attached hereto is Exhibit A, and its findings and holdings are 
incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, Applied Geotechnical Engineering Consultants, Inc. ("AGEC") has 
completed a study on the suitability of the Canyon Meadows subdivision for use of septic 
tanks and drain fields. A copy of this study is attached hereto as Exhibit B, and 
incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Geological Survey has reviewed the AGEC septic study and 
determined that the report adequately addresses septic-tank suitability. A copy of this 
review is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, AGEC has completed a preliminary slope stability investigation of the 
Canyon Meadows subdivision and has decided based on available data, including the 
UDOT study, that additional data must be obtained to reach a final conclusion on 
stability. A copy of this study is attached hereto as Exhibit D, and incorporated herein ; 
and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Geological Survey has reviewed the AGEC slope stability study 
and concluded that AGEC's conclusions are not overly conservative based on AGEC's 
assumptions. A copy of this review is attached hereto as Exhibit E, and incorporated 
herein; and 
WHEREAS, based on the AGEC studies and the Utah Geological Survey review, the 
1188 
10440 i 
County Health Department and the County Planner recommend that the moratorium found 
in Ordinance 97-1 be extended to permit the Commission to consider a change in the 
zoning of the Canyon Meadows Subdivision with respect to septic tanks and fields, and to 
permit AGEC to conduct a complete study of the slope stability in the Canyon Meadows 
Subdivision; and 
WHEREAS, the County cannot issue building permits or approve subdivisions for lots in 
areas where soil and water conditions are not sufficient for septic tanks to adequately and 
safely handle the wastewater from the building; and 
WHEREAS, the County cannot issue building permits for lots in areas where the slope 
stability does not provide sufficient margins of safety; and 
WHEREAS, the County has determined that because of the absence of an appropriate 
waste water disposal system, it is in the best interests of the County and in the interest of 
the health and safety of its residents to continue the suspension of the sale of lots and the 
issuance of building permits in the Canyon Meadows subdivision area of Wasatch County, 
except as provided herein; and 
WHEREAS, the County has determined that the slope in and around the Canyon 
Meadows Subdivision may not be sufficiently stable for residential development, that 
further study is required, and that the risk to the public's health and safety is sufficiently 
sever to require a suspension of the sale of lots and the issuance of building permits in the 
area outlined in yellow on Exhibit F; and 
WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch County finds, for the above 
reasons, a compelling countervailing public interest exists requiring that temporary zoning 
regulations be adopted to restrict the sale of lots as building lots and the issuance of 
building permits as set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance or 
approval of applications for building permits requiring septic tanks and drain fields for sewage 
disposal in the Canyon Meadows area of Wasatch County. 
2. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit the sale of lots in 
the Canyon Meadows subdivision with the representation that septic tanks are or will be allowed, 
and without the express disclaimer informing the prospective buyer of this ordinance. 
3. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance or 
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approval of applications for building permits which would permit building in the area outlined in 
yellow on Exhibit F, prior to completion of a complete slope stability study. 
4. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance of 
applications for subdivision approvals which would permit building in the area outlined in yellow 
on Exhibit F area prior to completion of the complete slope stability study. 
5. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit the sale of land 
within the yellow outlined area on Exhibit F, with the representation that buildings could be built 
there or would be allowed, and without the express disclaimer informing the prospective buyer of 
this ordinance. 
6. The temporary regulations adopted by this Ordinance shall remain in effect until 
the Commission can hear and decide permanent changes in the zoning regulations for septic tanks 
and slope stability. 
7. The provisions of this Ordinance are severable. If any provision of this Ordinance 
is found to be invalid, unlawful or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
balance of the Ordinance shall be unaffected and continue in full force and effect. 
8. This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon signing and one 
publication in a newspaper having local circulation. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch County, 
Utah, this day of , 199 . 
WASATCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
T. LaREN PROVOST 
KEITH JACOBSEN 
SHARRON WINTERTON 
ATTEST: 
BRENT TITCOMB, COUNTY CLERK 
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ORDINANCE NO. SI -13 
AN ORDINANCE ADOFTING TEMPORARY ZONING RULES AISD 
RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE CANYON 
MEADOWS AREA OF WASATCH COUNTY 
WHEREAS, Canyon Meadows is a mountain subdivision located in the Provo Canyon 
area of Wasatch County that has been in existence for approximately 25 years; and 
WHEREAS, the Canyon Meadows subdivision was"originally approved based on a plan 
for individual septic tanks for wastewater treatment; and 
WHEREAS, on January 13, 1997, the Commission enacted Ordinance 97-1: (1) that 
prohih:^ed +he accentarce r r apr^ov?1 of arplic^'ons for building permit^ requiring septic 
tdiiks xbr ^dwage disposal L. the Jany^n Mjad_ ./s subdivision, \1) ;nat ^ohL._ed 
acceptance of applications for subdivision approvals which contemplate septic tanks and 
drain fields for sewage disposal on properties adjacent to the Canybn Meadows 
subdivision of Wasatch County, and (3) that directed the staff of Wasatch County tc 
prepare a comprehensive study of the suitability of the continued or future use of septic 
tanks and drain fields in the Canyon Meadows subdivision and surrounding areas and of 
the geological stability of the Canyon Meadows subdivision and surrounding areas. A 
copy of Ordinance 97-1 is attached hereto is Exhibit A, and its findings and holdings are 
incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, Applied Geotechnical Engineering Consultants, Inc. ("AGEC") has 
completed a study on the suitability of the Canyon Meadows subdivision for use of septic 
tanks and drain fields. A copy of this study is attached hereto as Exhibit B, and 
incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Geological Survey has reviewed the AGEC septic study and 
determined that the report adequately addresses septic-tank suitability. A copy of this 
review is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated herein; and 
WHEREAS, AGEC has completed a preliminary slope stability investigation cflhe 
Canyon Meadows subdivision and has decided based on available data, including the 
UDOT study, that additional data must be obtained to reach a final conclusion on 
stability. A copy of this study is attached hereto as ExhfDit D, and incorporated herein ; 
and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Geological Survey has reviewed the AGEC slope stability study 
and concluded that AGECs conclusions are not overly conservative based on AGECs 
assumptions. A copy of this review is attached hereto as Exhibit E, and incorporated 
herein; and 
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WHEREAS, based on the AGEC studies and the Utah Geological Survey review, the 
County Health Department and the County Planner recommend that the moratorium found 
in Ordinance 97-1 be extended to permit the Commission to consider a chance in the 
zoning of the Canyon Meadows Subdivision with respect to septic tanks and~fields, and to 
permit AGEC to conduct a complete study of the slope stability in the Canyon Meadows 
Subdivision; and 
WHEREAS, the County cannot issue building permits or approve subdivisions for lots in 
areas where soil and water conditions are not sufficient for septic tanks to adequately and 
safely handle the wastewater from the building; and 
WHEREAS, the County cannot issue building permits for lots in areas where the slope 
stability io not pro -ide fine" it margins of sa^iy. -jid 
WHEREAS, the County has determined that because of the absence of an appropriate 
waste water disposal system, it is in the best interests of the County and in the interest of 
the health and safety of its residents to continue the suspension of'the sale of lots and the 
issuance of building permits in the Canyon Meadows subdivision area of Wasatch Counry 
except as provided herein, and 
WHEREAS, the County has determined that the slope in and around the Canyon 
Meadows Subdivision may not be sufficiently stable for residential development, that 
further study is required, and that the risk to the public's health and safety is sufficiently 
sever to require a suspension of the sale of lots and the issuance of building permits in the 
area outlined in yellow on Exhibit F; and 
Vi HEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch Counry finds, for the above 
reasons, a compelling countervailing public interest exists requiring that temporary zonine 
regulations be adopted to restrict the sale of lots as building lots and the issuance of 
building permits as sst forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1 - Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance or 
approval of applications for building permits requiring septic tanks and drain fieids for sewage 
disposal m the Canyon Meadows are3 of Wasatch County. = 
2. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit the sale of lots in 
the Canyon Meadows subdivision with the representation that septic tanks are or will be allowed 
and without the express disclaimer informing the prospective buyer of this ordinance 
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3. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance or 
approval of applications for building permits which would permit building in the area outlined in 
yellow on Exhibit F, ^ o r to completion of a sione stability study establishing thatJhe property 
is-sufficiemly stable for residentiaTbuilding under accepted safety and building principles. 
0 ————^__—————————^———————— . _ , _ _ , ______ - ____——_—__ 
4. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit acceptance of 
applications for subdivision approvals which would permit building in the area outlined in yellow 
on Exhibit F area prior to completion of a slope stability study estabUshing that the property is 
sufficiently stable for residential building under accepted safety and building principles. 
5. Temporary zoning regulations are hereby adopted which prohibit the sale of land 
within the yellow outlined area on Exhibit F, with the representation that buildings could be built 
there or would be allowed, and without the express disclaimer imbrming the prospective buyer of 
th o orcin___ce. 
6 The temporary regulations adopted by this Ordinance shall remain in effect until 
the Commission can hear and decide permanent changes in the zoning regulations for septic tanks 
and slope stability. 
7. The provisions of this Ordinance are severable. If any provision of this Ordinance 
is found to be invalid, unlawful or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction- the 
balance of the Ordinance shall be unaffected and continue in full force and effect. 
8. This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon signing and one 
publication in a newspaper having local circulation. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch County, 
Utah, this £ day of &cj- , l99J.-
WASATCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
T.LaREN PROVOST 
KEITH JACOBSEN 
SHARRON WJ_<nERTON 
BRENT TITCOMBT COUNTY CLERK 
WASATCH CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
POLICY FOR DETERMINATION OF 
GROUND WATER ELEVATION 
Pursuant to R-317-503-2, ground water requirements of "Individual Wastewater Disposal 
Systems" R317-501 through R317-513, Utah Administrative Code and under authority of Utah 
Code Section 26A-1-121 Utah code Annotated, 1953 as amended, the Wasatch City-County 
Board of Health adopts the following policy regarding the procedures for the determination of 
ground water. 
The elevation of the anticipated maximum ground water elevation shall be at least 4 feet below 
the bottom of the absorption system excavation. In order to ensure that this requirement can be 
met, the following procedures will be followed to determine the maximum ground water 
elevation. 
When the "Suitability For Wastewater Disposal and Septic-Tank-Soil-Absorption Systems, 
Wasatch County1', as prepared by the Utah Geological Survey indicates that the depth of the 
shallowest expected water table is from 0-5 feet, or where past experience, soil structure or 
historical information indicates that a potential ground water problem may exist, ground water 
jservation wells must be constructed and the ground water table monitored for a period of one 
year Any deviations from the one year monitoring period will be accepted only when the health 
department has reliable information as to the time of year that the ground water table is at the 
maximum ground water elevation. Unusually dry years and other climatological and other 
environmental factors may require a longer monitoring period. 
Observations and recordings of the observations must receive oversight from the health 
department. The frequency of the monitoring must be pre-arranged with the health department. 
The monitoring schedule will take into account the season of the year and historical data as to the 
anticipated maximum high ground water elevation. 
All costs associated with the excavation, construction, placement of the monitoring wells and the 
monitoring must be the responsibility of the person or persons requesting the tests. Qualified 
engineers may be required to do the monitoring. Fees may also be imposed by the Wasatch City-
County board of Health to cover health department costs. 
Adopted this ;<yfo Day of February 1997. 
onnie Tatton, Chair 
asatch City/County Board of Health 
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JR3 17-501 Individual Wastewater Systems 
jo i 7-501-1 Definitions 
1.22 Ground Water —that portion of subsurface water that is in the zone of 
saturation, including underground streams 
1.23 Ground Water Table—the surface of a body of unconfined ground water in 
which the pressure is equal to that of the atmosphere. 
R317-503-2 Ground Water Requirements 
2.2 The maximum ground water table shall be determined by one or more of the 
following methods: 
A. Direct visual observation of the seasonal high stand of the shallow ground water table 
in a soil exploration pit. 
B. Regular monitoring of the water level in an observation well for a period of one year, 
of for the period of maximum seasonal ground water table. 
C. Observation of soil in a soil exploration pit for evidence of crystals of salt left by the 
ground water table; or chemically reduced iron in the soil, reflected by mottled coloring. 
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Attachment 3. 
WASATCH CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
POLICY FOR REVIEWING REQUESTS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL WASTEWATER 
PERMIT REQUIRING ENGINEERING DESIGN 
A. PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to ensure that suitable wastewater treatment 
facilities are provided to human dwellings and other buildings that require 
wastewater disposal. 
B POLICY: It is the established policy of the Health Department that before a permit is 
issued on a proposed building site using an individual wastewater disposal 
system the following procedures must be followed: 
1. If more than one of the following conditions are found on a 
proposed building site, the Wasatch City-County Health 
Department will require a registered Environmental Health 
Scientist or a licensed engineer that is qualified to design 
individual wastewater disposal systems to make a site 
assessment to determine if the site is suitable for an individual 
wastewater disposal system that is allowed under State and County 
rules. 
a. Observed or potential ground water within 6 feet or less of 
ground surface. (See policy for determining ground water 
elevation). 
b. Observed or potential shallow bed rock within 6 feet or less 
of ground surface. 
c. Slopes 15% or greater within the proposed building area. 
d. Irregular topography or alteration of the topography that 
may limit the functionality of the proposed system. 
e. Watercourses, ponds, land drains, lakes or other water 
features within 100 feet of the proposed building area. 
f. Soils with inconsistent horizons within the proposed 
wastewater disposal area. 
g. Any other feature or potential issue which may give cause 
to limit the system location or functionality of the proposed 
system. 
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2. If the design engineer site assessment determines that the site is feasible 
and the Health Department review confirms that it is feasible to construct 
an individual wastewater disposal system on the property, engineered 
plans must be submitted to the Health Department for review using the 
"Individual Wastsewater Disposal Rules", R317-508-2.5 through R317-
508-2.10. The Health Department will review the design plans to 
determine compliance with the wastewater rules The designer is 
responsible for all testing that is conducted on the proposed site. 
3. When a permit to construct is issued by the Health Department, and the 
system is constructed, the designer must certify that the system was 
installed according to the design plans and meets the requirements of the 
wastewater rules. Any changes to the approved design during the 
construction of the system will require the design engineer and Health 
Department written approval. The Health Department will also make 
required construction inspections. 
4. Construction of the system must be completed, inspected and 
approved by the Health Department and the design engineer before 
the construction of the dwelling can commence. 
5. The ultimate responsibility for the design, operation and maintenance of 
the wastewater disposal system is the responsibility of the home owner. 
Adopted this 17th Day of March 1998 
Connie Tatton, Chairwoman 
Wasatch City-County Board of Health 
wwpcy 
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Attachment 4 
WASATCH CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
POLICY FOR REVIEWING REQUESTS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL WASTEWATER 
PERMIT BY THE HOME OWNER 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to ensure that suitable wastewater treatment 
facilities are provided to human dwellings or other buildings that require 
wastewater disposal. 
POLICY: It is the established policy of the Health Department that before a permit is 
issued on a proposed building site using an individual wastewater disposal 
system, a Registered Environmental Health Scientist employed by the 
Health Department may help the home owner design the system if the 
information as required in the "Individual Wastewater Disposal Systems" 
rules R317-508-2.5 through R317-508-2.10, is provided to the Health 
Department. This includes a scaled (1"= 30 ft. or better) plot plan with the 
following information. 
1. Direction of north 
2. Lot size and dimensions 
3. Parcel identification number 
4. Ground surface contours at two foot intervals of the 
original and final grades when the natural contour is equal 
to or exceeds five percent for absorption fields and ten 
percent for seepage trenches 
5. Location of proposed driveway, parking areas and any 
other pavement 
6. Maximum number of bedrooms (including unfinished 
rooms) or type of dwelling and the estimated wastewater 
flow 
7. Location of soil exploration and percolation pits 
8. Location of any culinary water lines 
9. Depth and location of sewer line exiting the building 
10. Location of culinary water well serving the building 
11. Location of other culinary water wells within 200 feet of 
property line 
12. Location of other wastewater disposal systems within 200 
feet of the property line 
13. Location of a public culinary water system source within 
1500 feet, of the property line 
14. Location of all streams (year-round or intermittent), 
ditches, water courses, ponds, surface drains that could be 
within 110 feet of the proposed system 
15. Location of any land drains within 100 feet of the proposed 
system 
16. Locations of any easements and drainage right-of-way 
affecting the property 
17. Septic tank manufacturer 
Results of the soil exploration and percolation tests must also 
accompany the application. (See policy on Health Depanment witnessing 
tests). 
The Health Department does not assume any liability when asked to help 
design a system or for any other problems encountered during the 
approval and inspection process. 
The ultimate responsibility for the design, operation and maintenance of 
the wastewater disposal system is the responsibility of the home owner. 
Adopted this 17th day of March, 1998 
uf
 rt^:* ^y^yft^ 
ConnTTTatton, Chairwoman 
Wasatch City-County Board of Health 
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Attachment 5 
WASATCH CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
POLICY FOR ISSUANCE OF BUILDING PERMIT CLEARANCE 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to ensure that suitable culinary water and 
sewage treatment is provided to human dwellings. 
POLICY: It is the established policy of the Health Department that before clearance 
for a building permit is issued by the Health Department, the following 
items will be required: 
1. When the proposed method of wastewater disposal is by means of a septic tank 
and drain field, the following items are required to be submitted to the Health 
Department: 
a. Soil exploration tests, percolation tests, plot plans, and other information 
as required in the Individual Wastewater Disposal Systems Rules (R317-
501-515) must be submitted and reviewed by the Health Department. 
b. "Policies for Reviewing Requests for an Individual Wastewater Permit 
Requiring Engineering Design1* and "Policy for Reviewing Requests for 
an Individual Wastewater Permit by the Home Owner"' must be followed. 
2. When the proposed method of wastewater disposal is by means of a public sewer 
system, a letter from the service district must be provided to the Health 
Department indicating that sewer services will be provided by the district to the 
dwelling. 
3. Verification of culinary water supply must be submitted: 
a. When a private water supply is provided, a copy of a well permit or well 
permit application from the State Engineer's Office must be provided to 
the Health Department. In areas where knowledge of successful wells is 
not known, construction of the well, the firm yield, and water quality tests 
will be required before a private water source will be accepted. 
b. All public water systems, which include "community," "non-community," 
and "non-transient-non-community" water systems providing culinary 
water, must have written authorization from the representative from the 
water supplier indicating that water meeting culinary water quality and 
quantity standards will be provided to the dwelling.. 
T
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 wcrfem is rated "approved," building permit clearance can be 
given. 
2) If the system is rated: "not approved," clearance for the building 
permit will not be given until the water system rating has been 
upgraded from the "not approved" status. 
3) If the system is rated "corrective action," clearance for a building 
permit may be issued. 
4. In the event that a new water system is being developed or an existing waler 
system is being expanded to provide water to the dwelling, clearance for the 
building permit will not be issued until the distribution system is in place and 
culinary quality water is available at the lot site. 
PROCEDURE: 
1. After the appropriate information is provided to the Health Department, a review 
will be made to determine compliance with the appropriate rules. 
2. The plot plan will be stamped indicating that the plans have been reviewed by an 
authorized employee of the Health Department. The date and signature will be 
applied to the plans. 
3. Appropriate Health Department fees are paid. 
4. An "Individual Wastewater Permit" letter will be issued to the permit applicant. 
5. The approved sewage facility portion of the Building Permit Application form 
will be signed and dated by the authorized employee of the Health Department. 
6. Permits are valid for a period of one year. An extension of one year may be 
granted if requested by the permit holder. 
DATED this 17th day of March. 1998 
Qv^^^U^ T« <3L 
Connie Tatton, Chairwoman 
Wasatch City-County Board of Health 
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Attachment fi 
WASATCH CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
FOR 
CERTIFICATION OF PERCOLATION TESTERS 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to ensure that individuals who conduct 
percolation tests are qualified to determine the suitability of soils for the 
installation of "Individual Wastewater Disposal Systems" as required by 
R317-1.5 of the "Individual Wastewater Disposal System" rules. 
POLICY: It is the established policy of the Health Department that any individual 
conducting soil and site evaluations for Wastewater Disposal System must 
be certified by the Health Department. Licensed engineers qualified to 
perform and design Wastewater Disposal Systems may be certified by the 
department to perform soil and site evaluations. 
1. In order to become certified by the Department to conduct soil 
percolation tests and do site assessments the following 
requirements must be met: 
a. An application to become a certified soil tester must be 
completed on an application supplied by the Health 
Department. 
b. All applications shall be required to attend a training 
seminar and may be required to pass an examination 
conducted by the Department. Training seminars will be 
held when needed as determined by the Health Director. 
c. Recertification will be required from time to time 
determined by the Board of Health. 
d. Fees may be assessed to cover the costs of administration 
of the certification program as determined by the Board of 
Health. 
e. Suspension or revocation of the certification will be 
enforced v\hen any of the duties of the tester have been 
performed in a negligent manner, incompetently or have 
been found to falsify any information. The first offense is a 
mandatory one year suspension. Two suspensions is 
grounds for permanent revocation. 
2. At the discretion of the Health Department, an individuaJ may 
perform a percolation test on their own property without becoming 
certified by the Health Department, under the following conditions: 
a. The lot on which the test is performed must be owned by 
the individual. 
b. The individual must receive training on test procedures 
from the Health Department and follow the requirements as 
outlined in R317-511. 
Adopted this 17th day of day of March, 1998 
{^AA-^^UU i i^y^-
Connie Tatton, Chairwoman 
Wasatch City-County Board of Health 
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PUBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that the Board of County Commissioners of 
Wasatch County will hold a regular public meeting in Commission Chambers in the 
County Courthouse, 25 North Main Street, Heber City, Utah, commencing at 3:30 P.M. 
Monday, January 13,1997. 
WASATCH COUNTY COMMISSION MEETING 
AGENDA 
DATE: January 13,1997 
3:30 Minutes 
3:45 Kent Berg, Public Works Director 
Adoption of FMHA Loan/Bond Resolution Transfer Station Rates 
4:00 Harper, CCC 
4:15 Appeal Roll Back , sage Acre's Subdivision, Scott Wright 
4:30 TANS, Ballard Sphar 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUANCE AND SALE OF WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH TAX AND REVENUE 
ANTICIPATION NOTES, SERIES 1997A IN THE AGGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY S900,000 00 
AWARDING AND CONFIRMING SALE OF THE NOTES, AND ENTERING INTO CERTAIN COVENANTS AND MAKING 
CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS ON CONNECTION THEREWITH, AND APPROVING THE FORM OF THE NOTES 
4:45 Cares, grant Mrs. Carr 
5:00 County Attorney Matters, Resolution For Strawberry Lake SSD 
AGENDA MATTERS TO BE HEARD AS TIME PERMITS 
1. Press 
2 \>usuiess Lice: sts "2\eilJAuuito Tit^om' ^ 
3. Rod Earnshaw, Impact Fee 
4. Debbie Proctor 
5. Sheriff Dept. Matters Mike Spanos 
6. Heber Sewer Board 
7. Bob Mathis, Taber Engineering, and Contracts 
8. Executive, Personnel 
10^37.1 
January 13, 1997 
THE WASATCH COUNTY COMMISSION MET ACCORDING TO ORDINANCE 
PRESENT: Commissioner Provost, Commissioner Jacobson, Commissioner Winterton, 
Clerk/Auditor Titcomb, Wasatch Wave Editor NofFsinger 
MINUTES 
The Minutes of January 6, 1997 were read. Commissioner Jacobson made a motion to approve 
the minutes as read. Commissioner Provost seconded the motion that carried. 
ROD EARNSHAW 
IMPACT FEE 
Mr. Earnshaw met with the Commission to ask the County to forgive the impact fee on his lot and 
Home in Center Creek. He stated that he was working on the project for several years. He is still 
working on the fire hydrant. The commission stated that the law is firm on the fee and that the 
County Attorney will need to look at this matter. 
CANYON MEADOWS 
Ordinance No. 97-1 will put a six-month building moratorium in Canyon Meadows. 
Commissioner Jacobson made a motion to sign the ordinance and have it in the Wave for one* 
week. Commissioner Winterton seconded the motion that carried. 
Ordinance 97-2 will allow the projects that are under way to continue and to stop all new. • 
Commissioner Winterton made a motion to have the Ordinance published in the Wave for one 
week. Commissioner Jacobson seconded the motion that carried. 
KENT BERG 
PU3LICVOFKS 
ADOPTION OF FMHA LOAN/BOND RESOLUTION 
TRANSFER STATION RATES 
Robert McDonald met with the Commission to review with them the bid for new cabinets in the 
building. The bid is for $17,000.00 the new cabinets will be in the Clerk, Assessors and 
Treasurers' office. Commissioner Jacobson made the motion to approve the bid Commissioner 
Winterton seconded the motion that carried. 
Don Wood met with the Commission, with a bid for computer wiring for the building. Lucent bid 
$130.00 per. Cable Wiring Connection bid is $10,000.00 for the building. Commissioner 
Jacobson made a motion to approve the bid from Wiring Connection. Commissioner Winterton 
seconded the motion that carried. 
Kent Berg asked the Commission to approve a maintenance program. Commissioner Winterton 
made a motion to approve the program for fleet management. Commissioner Jacobson seconded 
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the motion that carried. 
Commissioner Winterton made a motion to approve the FMHA Loan/Bond Resolution 97-1. 
Commissioner Jacobson seconded the motion that carried. 
Commissioner Jacobson made a motion to try the punch card for garbage dumping again this 
year. If people do not have there card they will be charged. The card will have five punches The 
rate fee should be moved up to the same rates as Summit County. Commissioner Winterton 
seconded the motion that carried. (File) 
HARPER, CCC 
Bob Mathis reviewed with the Commission the nine recommendations that Harper and CCC, will 
need to meet before they can have a new Business license. Commissioner Jacobson made a 
motion to approve the Licenses upon the conditions that Bob presented. Commissioner 
Winterton seconded the motion that carried. (FILE) 
SHERIFF DEPT. 
MATTERS MIKE SPANOS 
Sheriff Spanos asked the Commission to approve the Contract with Steve Nielsen for the State 
inmates. He also asked that the Commission approve an exam bed and a bill from the State that 
will come out of fund 28. Commissioner Winterton made the motion to approve the contract and 
the two bills from fund 28. Commissioner Jacobson seconded the motion that carried. The 
sheriff also talked about the vehicles and trade-in values. The Commission asked that he and 
Kent Berg work on this matter more. 
HEBER SEWER BOARD 
Commissioner Jacobson made a motion to appoint Clod Hicken to the HVSSD. Commission 
Winterton seconded the motion that carried. 
TANS .AlUiKDfJEuJL 
Consideration of the issuance and sale of Wasatch county, Utah tax and revenue 
anticipation notes, series 1997a in the aggregate principal amount of approximately 
$900,000.00 awarding and confirming sale of the notes, and entering into certain covenants 
and making certain representations on connection therewith; and approving the form of 
the notes. 
Commissioner Jacobson made the motion to approve Resolution 97-2 for the TANS, 
Commissioner Provost seconded the motion that carried. 
PRESS 
Tom Noffisinger asked the Commission if Alarik Myrin ever met with the Commission. He has 
never been to Commission meeting but he has met with the Commission at the State Capital. 
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BOB MATHIS 
TABER ENGINEERING AND CONTRACTS 
Taber Engineering and Jophes Engineering will do the planning for the Jordanell traffic and 
master plan The land owners will pay for the cost Commissioner Winterton made a motion to 
approve the engineering for the Jordanell area Commissioner Jacobson seconded the motion that 
carried. 
Bob also presented a fee schedule for zoning. 
Kirk JOHNSON 
Kirk Johnson met with the Commission about a lot and home that he will build in Canyon 
Meadows and the problems that he is facing The Commission asked him to work out the 
problems with Planning and then come back to the Commission. 
HEATH DEPARTMENT 
Commissioner Jacobson made a motion to approve a raise for both Sky Morris and Tracy 
Richardson Commissioner Winterton seconded the motion that carried. Two merit increases for 
the JP Court were denied 
Mr Cannon would like to groom the trail to the top of Lake Creek, to meet with the States 
groomed trails 
Commissioner Winterton made a motion to close Commission meeting Commissioner Jacobson 
seconded the motion that carried. 
BEING NO FURTHER BUSINESS THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 6:30 P.M. 
Commission Chair T. LaREN Provost Clerk/Auditor Brent R. Titcomb 
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4 th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF DTAH 
CANYON MEADOWS HOMBOWNERS Et 
al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHIL WRIGHT Et al. 
D e f e n d a n t , 
MINUTES 
REVIEW/SCHEDULING 
Case No: 990500239 PR 
Judge: FRED D. HOWARD 
Date: October 3 , 2000 
C l e r k : r o s e b 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) : GORDON DUVAL 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : DEREK P FULLAN 
Other Parties: CRAIG WENTZ 
HEARING 
There will be no record of this hearing, the parties appearing by 
telephone. Mr Wentz reports that there is only one remaining issue 
in this case, aJi ntheir issues.being decided in other cases. The 
Court prepares a scheduling order that will be mailed 
to all parties. This case is set for final pre-trial on February 
21, 2001 at 9:00 am for three hours. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 02/21/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
before Judge FRED D. HOWARD 
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RESOLUTION NO 3fbll 
BE FT RESOLVED tha, the Wasatch County Personne. Po.icy. Section 
XVminscellaneous. is amended to read as follows: 
F C ^ r n m u m c a n o i w i t i j ^ r ^ ^ 
Btigarion against Wasatch County,.e^ « « , p ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 fr a n d 
services of the County shall rema n avaJ^e t P
 C o u n t y , s ^ l 
unrelated to the pending ' ' "f0" ' " ° X t e ^ t h plaintiffs regarding matters related to 
e r 0up " no elected offical shall ro™r"" " ' ^ e m p l o y e e who performs a major 
he pending litigation. No d = P — ^ ^ c pating" as a principal decision 
£ S S * SEES?* p— - — e wnh p,a,nt,ffs 
regarding matters related to the pending Imgafon. 
When plaintiffs attempt , communicate * ^ ^ " J ^ S ^ 
ountv department heads or county ^ ^ f ^
 c o u n t y e m p | o y ee shall 
Nation, the elected official. - " ^ ^ X f e t t e plaintiff to the County Attorney's 
immediately terminate * = ^ C h Count" At rnev',P Office shall elect whether or no, 
TC - I ^ t , " ffi " - - head, or county employee w,l, respond to 
S l u S " related to pending litiganon. 
[End Amendment] 
The County Cler, shall d i l u t e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
A l t Uf U l r t n 
)L~NTY OF WASATCH ) 
, • ed the duly qualified and acting County Clerk of W « t c h County Utt*. 
I, the unders.gned, the duly q
 C o m m i s s i o ners do hereby certify, according to the 
d ex officio Clerk of the Board ^ ^ C o ^ m y o w n p l e d g e and belief, that in 
:0rds of said Board ,n my o f f i c e P ° ^ 0 ' ^ ^ U t a h Code Annotate, 1953, as amended, 
cordance with the requirement o f ^ ^ J 2 ^ ' ^
 a n d p l a c e of the May 10th, 1999, 
ve caused to be published " ° ^ ? ^ n ^ n ^ s s i o n s of Wasatch County, Utah by: 
blic meeting held by the Boariof CountyCon*n, ^ ^ ^
 Q ^ 
(a) Causing a Notice of Pub he mee n ^ ^ ^ M & y ^ 1 9 9 9 > a t l e a s t 
e County Administration, B u d c n g - ^ ^
 m e e t i n g , in t h e form attached hereto as 
,enty-four (24) hours before th^conve:ning
 r e m a i n e d s 0 p o s t e d a n d available for 
J * A, said Notice of Public M ^ ^ ^
 t h e B J r d u n t i l t h e convening of the meeting; 
iblic inspection dunng the regui 
>d
 f t h e Notice of Public meeting in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
(b) Causing a copy of th ^ ° t , c e ot
 twenty.four hours before the convening of 
to be provided on or » ^ ^ 7 ^ '
 o f g e n e r a , cirCulation withing the geographic 
« meeting, to The Wasatch Wo*. ^ ^
 me=dia correspondent, newspaper, rad.o station, 
insdiction of Wasatch County ^ - a c h 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ o f C o u n t y 
r television station which has requ 
ommissioners 
omrnib^iuii^io 
^pressed hereon the official seal 01 
.«?_^2_"»yofM,y-1999 
, JI^^JL-^^^^^ 
• Notary Public Brent R. Titcombf, Clerk 
« E M > Board of County Commissioners 
* ? : £ £ M S £ i wa«,rch County, Utah K S S d S 1 Wasatch County, Utah Marc* 29. 2001 . 
State^oUJtah
 —
 J 
SUBSCRIBED .AND SWORN .o -ne. a Nc.a^ Pob.ic, to ^ , of „i.y. . 9 , . 
'Zpffi$"^t/^-
Residing i n : _ ? / ^ f / W • 
My commission expires^ ^ ^ 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN and OLGA GARDNER; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOARD of COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of 
WASATCH COUNTY; et al, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: June 21, 2001 
Case Number: 990401676 
Division V: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment which 
address or impact virtually every cause of action alleged in the Amended Complaint. The Court 
will consider each cause of action in light of any party's request for ruling on that cause of action. 
In consideration of a request for summary judgment: 
[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) quoting Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover,: 
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. URCP, Rule 56(c). 
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This case involves a development within Wasatch County in Provo Canyon described as 
"Canyon Meadows," together with the surrounding area. Some or all of the development is 
located on an area with a long history of instability and land slippage. There has been justified 
concern regarding slope stability and the suitability of the area for building and especially for 
septic systems. This suit challenges restrictions and/or requirements for issuing building permits 
imposed at various times by the Wasatch County Commission. 
First Cause of Action 
In the first cause of action the Plaintiffs challenge county ordinances 97-1 and 97-13. Li 
paragraphs 98 through 102 the Plaintiffs raise 5 separate arguments to support their claim that the 
ordinances either are or should be declared to be null and void ab initio. 
In response Defendants direct the Court to U.C.A. §17-27-1001(2) for the proposition 
that Plaintiffs' state law claims should be dismissed. The statute requires a challenge to a land use 
decision made by a county to be made within 30 days of the local decision. Ordinance 97-01 was 
enacted on January 13, 1997. This state law challenge, as to Ordinance 97-01, was filed in 
September, 1997 and was not timely and cannot be sustained. 
Ordinance 97-13 was approved by vote on August 11, 1997. The Ordinance was signed 
in October, 1997 and published in November, 1997. This challenge was commenced in 
September, 1997-after the affirmative vote by the commission but before signing or publication. 
The question is further complicated by the substance of Ordinance 97-13 in that the Ordinance 
appears to be an attempt to re-enact, with slight modification, Ordinance 97-6 which was debated 
and approved by vote of the commission on July 21, 1997. Ordinance 97-13 appears to be 
identical to Ordinance 97-6 except that the subsequent Ordinance allows an exception to the 
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building moratorium if the applicant can provide an independent study demonstrating the safety of 
the proposed improvement. It does not appear that Ordinance 97-6 was ever signed or published. 
Ordinance 97-6, although enacted well after the expiration of Ordinance 97-1, also appears to be 
an attempt to extend the life of that earlier enactment of the Commission. The Court concludes 
that Ordinance 97-1, which specifically provided that it would expire 6 months from the date of 
publication, had expired by July of 1997 and therefore, as a matter of law, could not be extended 
by a subsequent Ordinance. 
Ordinance 97-6 must, therefore, be considered as a separate enactment. In spite of an 
affirmative vote, there is no evidence before the Court that Ordinance 97-6 was ever signed or 
published. As a matter of law, Ordinance 97-6 has, therefore, never been an effective ordinance 
(U.C.A. § 17-53-208). A challenge to an Ordinance which has never been effective is a moot 
issue and will not be considered further. 
Ordinance 97-13, then, must be considered as a new enactment of whatever regulations or 
provisions it defines. The curious aspect of this analysis is that this challenge to Ordinance 97-13 
began within 30 days of the Commission decision, reflected by the affirmative vote, but before the 
Ordinance became effective by signing and publication. The Court concludes that the language 
within § 17-27-1001 specifically refers to the date of a decision, not the effective date of the 
ordinance and that this challenge is, therefore, timely filed and properly before the Court. 
These two ordinances were passed under the authority of U.C.A. §§ 17-5-2631 and 17-27-
404. Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 98 of the amended complaint that the ordinances were not 
necessary under § 17-5-263 to provide for the general health, safety and welfare of the public. 
1
 This § has now been renumbered as 17-53-223 
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The Supreme Court considered this section in 1980 and concluded that "[n]othing in § 17-5-77 
or in Title 17 suggests that the general welfare clause should be narrowly or strictly construed. Its 
breadth of language demands the opposite conclusion," State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116,1122 
(UT 1980).2 The undisputed evidence is that there has been a legitimate concern over the geology 
of the development area for a substantial period of time. In considering a similar challenge to the 
authority of a municipality to enact zoning regulation, the Supreme Court of Utah has stated: 
A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference.. . . 
(citations omitted) . . . Therefore, "the courts generally will not so interfere with 
the actions of a city council unless its action is outside of its authority or is so 
wholly discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious 
and arbitrary and thus in violation of the complainant's rights. Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 Utah 25, paragraph 23. 
There is nothing in the pleadings or the evidence before this Court by way of affidavit or 
other submission that would lead this Court to conclude that the County enactment of Ordinance 
97-13 was an arbitrary or capricious reaction to the long-standing geologic concerns. The 
Plaintiffs cause of action on this point fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff also claims a taking occurred3 under these ordinances without compensation and 
they are thus repugnant to the law and invalid (United States Constitution, Amendment V and 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I § 22, although no one in this case has briefed State 
Constitutional issues as distinct from claims under the United States Constitution). The court 
finds that no compensable taking has occurred. The Court has already concluded that there was a 
compelling public interest in determining whether the slope was stable and whether septic tanks 
2
 This case construed § 17-5-77 which was re-numbered in 1994 and, again, in 2000 so 
that the current § 17-53-223 is the same language. 
3
 See paragraph 99 of the amended complaint. 
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were viable and that the moratorium enacted upon development was a legitimate legislative 
response to that public welfare need. In Western Land Equities v. Logan. 617 P.2d 388 (UT 
1980) the Utah Supreme Court determined that a compelling public interest may prevail over a 
private economic interest. Zoning regulations which protect the public welfare have generally 
been held to not be compensable public takings, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 
U.S. 104 at 125 (1978). 
Plaintiff also claims that these ordinances are invalid for not having been submitted to the 
Planning Commission for their approval before consideration by the County Commission.4 The 
court after careful consideration of U.C.A. §17-27-404 holds that temporary regulations created 
under this section are subject only to the requirements of part 404 and therefore these ordinances 
need not have been submitted to the planning commission. In looking at the statute, it appears 
that the statute contemplates emergency short term measures and suspends, specifically, the 
normal requirement of a public hearing. Since planning commission meetings are open to the 
public, it seems that the legislature contemplated that the legislative body could pass a temporary 
regulation without any other input upon making the proper findings. 
Plaintiffs also claim that the ordinances illegally imposed fees on the property owners. 
Ordinance 97-13 created an exception to the moratorium by allowing approval of construction if 
the private landowner went to the additional expense of obtaining and providing a study to 
demonstrate the safety of the project. The Plaintiffs assert that the cost incurred by this additional 
requirement amounts to a "fee," improperly imposed. The court finds that these costs were an 
alternative expense that permit seekers would have to incur if they declined to wait for the other 
4
 Ibid at 100. 
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study to be done. This is not actually a fee and as such is not contrary to Utah law. 
In summary to this point, the Court concludes that only the Plaintiffs state law challenge 
to Ordinance 97-13 may be considered. The challenge to Ordinance 97-1 was not timely. The 
challenge to Ordinance 97-6 is moot. The Challenge to Ordinance 97-13 under this cause of 
action is found to be without merit, as a matter of law since the Ordinance appears to be a 
legitimate legislative response to a public welfare concern. The regulation does not constitute a 
compensable taking, the emergency Ordinance need not have been submitted to the Planning 
Commission for prior approval under the circumstances of this case and the additional expense 
required for approval under the Ordinance did not constitute a fee for statutory purposes. The 
Defendants should, therefore, receive summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. 
Second Cause of Action 
The Second Cause of action alleges 42 U.S.C. §1983 violations by the County 
Commissioners and Defendants Mathis and Wright and includes claims that ordinances 97-1, 97-
13 and resolution 99-11 violate the constitutional principles of Due Process and Equal Protection. 
The court finds that the actions of the county commissioners were legislative in nature. 
Under Bopan v. Harris, 523 US 44 (1998) the County Commissioners have absolute immunity for 
their actions related to these Ordinances, regardless of any alleged malice. 
Some of Defendants Wright and Mathis's alleged actions, if proven, are clearly non-
legislative in nature and a cause of action might be sustained with proof of bad faith and/or malice. 
Such a determination would plainly require the receipt and weighing of evidence. Accordingly, 
the Court cannot summarily rule on the §1983 cause of action against these Defendants. 
Page 6 o f 15 
2135 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as it pertains to the second cause of 
action concerning each of the county commissioners, but the motion is denied as to Defendants 
Mathis and Wright and the governmental entities. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is 
denied as to this cause of action. 
Third Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege in the third cause of action that the moratorium and/or additional 
expense imposed by the Ordinances constitute an inverse condemnation of their property for 
which compensation should be paid. The case law makes it quite clear that an inverse 
condemnation claim requires that the property in question be taken for public use. See Farmers 
New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241. There is a distinction between a 
physical taking for public use and the regulation of property to prevent effluent seepage or 
building upon unstable ground. The moratorium and fees imposed by the Ordinances are not a 
physical taking. As noted above, the imposition of such regulation generally does not require 
compensation. Moreover, government entities may, under proper circumstances, deprive 
property owners of all economic benefit of their property through zoning if it could have 
otherwise been done under a theory of nuisance. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
505 U.S. 1003. The court considers the Plaintiffs' own concerns about contaminated ground 
water, seepage of effluent on to other property and slope instability as sufficient reasons to 
impose this moratorium. Plaintiffs were concerned that problems would occur if surrounding 
areas were developed. This concern coupled with reports from state and private agencies caused 
the county to impose the moratoria until they could be sure that there was no public health risk or 
other concerns. The court finds that there was a legitimate concern of a threat to public safety to 
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justify the moratoria. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to the third cause 
of action. 
Fourth Cause of Action 
In the fourth cause of action the Plaintiffs claim that the County already had appropriate 
zoning protections for the subject property in place before the Ordinances questioned in this 
action were enacted, rendering the Ordinances unnecessary. The Plaintiffs also allege that the 
County is estopped from denying building permits under the Ordinance because Defendants 
Mathis and Wright represented, shortly before the Ordinances were adopted, that if some of the 
Plaintiffs purchased property within the development that they could expect no problems. Finally, 
the Plaintiffs wish a declaratory judgment from this Court that the moratoria imposed by the 
Ordinances are no longer in effect. 
First, the court finds that as a matter of law the zoning estoppel claim that is based on 
prior zoning activity fails. The court finds that the county became reasonably concerned about the 
general suitability of the area for building and properly acted under its police power to protect the 
public health and safety. The County acted under a Statute that authorized its conduct. The fact 
that prior regulations and/or approvals existed or were made merely reinforces the legitimacy of 
the conclusion that an emergency moratorium was required until further study was complete. 
There is some evidence that defendants Wright and Mathis made representations shortly 
before the first moratorium that some individual plaintiffs had property suitable for building and 
that there would be no problems. Generally, estoppel cannot be asserted against a government 
agency unless special circumstances exist. These special circumstances have been defined by the 
Utah Court of Appeals as: 
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where the interests of justice mandate an exception to the general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts 
may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient 
gravity, to invoke the exception. And in case there is doubt on such matters, it 
should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a trial of the issue, as 
opposed to summary rejection thereof. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon 
County. 805 P.2d 789 at 792 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Court is unable, on the state of the record at this time, to determine if the interests of 
justice would mandate application of the doctrine in this case. Summary judgment on this point 
must be denied. 
As far as a declaratory judgment that the moratoria are no longer in effect, the court 
considers that issue to be moot. From the number of permits issued since this case began, it is 
evident that no moratorium remains. Both Ordinances have expired and are no longer being 
enforced. 
Fifth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that there was inadequate notice before the adoption of Ordinances 
97-1 and 97-13, amounting to a deprivation of substantive and procedural due process under the 
United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs also assert that equal protection rights were violated. 
This equal protection claim does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class. This 
requires the court to apply the rational basis test, Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 
F.3rd 504 at 532 (10th Cir., 1998). The standard is whether there is "any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." See F C C , v. Beach 
Communications- Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). The court finds that the classification had a rational 
basis based on concerns of the Plaintiffs, other concerns about slope stability, and septic tank 
suitability. The Equal Protection claim fails as a matter of law. 
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The next claim of substantive due process violation also fails. This claim also requires the 
court to apply the rational basis test. See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 958 P.2d 245 (Ut. Ct. 
1998). The court has already held that there was a rational basis for the ordinances in question. 
The Substantive Due Process claim fails as a matter of law. 
The Procedural Due Process Claim also fails as a matter of law. The court finds that the 
required notice was given for Ordinance 97-13 and that Ordinance 97-1 did not require a hearing 
as it was passed under the authority of U.C.A. 17-27-404. It appears that this procedural due 
process claim actually challenges the statue that authorizes a temporary ordinance to be passed 
without notice. The statute sets forth the narrow findings that must be made to justify such an 
ordinance. The required compelling government interest overcomes the notice requirement of 
procedural due process. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to cause of 
action 5. 
Sixth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs claim that the ordinances violated U.C.A. §17-27-404 because they 
purported to be effective for longer than 6 months. 
The court finds that 97-1 expired by its terms within six months. There is a question of 
fact as to when ordinance 97-13 actually expired and the court will reserve a finding on that until 
it can hear all of the evidence and give it appropriate weight. Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is granted on this cause of action with regard to the validity of Ordinance 97-1 but 
denied with regard to Ordinance 97-13. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied as to 
the sixth cause of action. 
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Seventh Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 violate U.C.A. §17-27-404 in that 
there was no compelling countervailing public interest. 
The court finds that summaiy judgment may be granted to Defendants on this cause of 
action. The County Commission did make the required findings which are included within the 
Ordinances themselves. Given the deference5 that the court must give to legislative findings, the 
court finds that there was sufficient basis for the county to find that a compelling countervailing 
public interest existed at the time that the ordinances were enacted. 
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege in these two causes of action that they were harmed because of a 
representation by a County Attorney that Ordinance 97-13 was effective made on August 11, 
1997 before actual publication of the Ordinance and that County Officials subsequently enforced 
the Ordinance by denying certain Plaintiffs building permits before the Ordinance took effect. 
The court finds that it was improper for the county attorneys to declare the ordinance 
effective before its publication date. Ordinance 97-13 could not have been effective until it was 
published in November of 1997. The evidence presented to the Court on this point does indicate 
that no application for permits were received after August 11, 1997 until August 24, 1998. More 
significantly, the Plaintiffs have not alleged any legal theory or basis for recovery from the 
misstatement of law or enforcement, if it occurred at all, of the not yet valid Ordinance. They 
merely claim "equitable relief." The Court is unaware of any legal basis for such relief and, in any 
5
 See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, (1999) for a 
discussion of deference to legislative findings. 
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event, is unwilling to supply a basis not plead. Summary judgment for the Defendants on this 
point is appropriate. 
Tenth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege that Ordinance 97-13 was improperly adopted because a study 
required by Ordinance 97-1 was inadequate. 
The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action. The 
court finds that there were sufficient facts to support the findings of the legislature 
notwithstanding an incomplete report, if it was, in fact, incomplete. The court again notes the 
deference the court is required to give to legislative findings. 
Eleventh Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege that the County and the Health Department of the County committed 
trespass by drilling and periodically inspecting monitoring wells on the subject property to 
monitor groundwater. The Plaintiffs want damages from the trespass and an injunction to prohibit 
further intrusion. 
The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action. 
Declaratory relief is not available under the law for the tort of trespass. The Statute is UCA 
§78-33-2, which reads as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights, status 
or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or 
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under 
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
Plaintiffs complain of an intentional tort not their rights under the ordinances that they question, 
nor do they challenge the validity of any ordinance that allows the trespass to occur. This cause 
Page 12 of 15 
212$ 
of action simply does not lend itself to relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act. 
The remaining issue for an injunction also fails as a matter of law. The court finds that it 
would be adverse to the public interest for the State not to be able to monitor ground water levels 
in this area. The Health Department is permitted to inspect the wells according to U.C.A. 58-56-
8(2). 
Twelfth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that the County committed the tort of interference with economic 
relations by the enactment of the Ordinances. 
The court finds that the government has not waived immunity for this cause of action.6 
The court also finds that there was no prohibition on sales contained in ordinance 97-13. Part 5 
of the ordinance merely prohibits sales in the Canyon Meadows area with a concurrent 
representation by the seller that building would be allowed. This same provision also requires an 
express reference to the ordinance with each sale of land. These provisions are not prohibitions 
on the sale of property. The court grants Defendants* motion for summary judgment on this 
cause of action. 
Thirteenth Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs assert that Resolution 99-11 infringes upon their constitutional rights by 
requiring County officials and employees to direct all inquiries regarding matters under litigation 
to the County Attorney. 
The court finds that this resolution does not infringe upon constitutional rights nor does it 
violate state law. The county legislators have merely assigned control over who disseminates 
6
 See U.C.A. 63-30-10(2) 
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litigation information to the department best able to do so. The court finds that there is no basis 
in fact to conclude that Defendants are depriving Plaintiffs of any of their rights through this 
resolution. The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action. 
Fourteenth Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against the County Commissioners and Defendants 
Mathis and Wright. The Court has already concluded that the actions of the Commissioners were 
protected by absolute immunity as noted above. No damages of any sort can be assessed against 
those Defendants. 
The court finds that there is a question of fact as to whether punitive damages may be 
appropriate against Defendants Mathis and Wright. 
Summary 
There are parts of four causes of action left to try. From the second cause of action, 
Plaintiffs' 42 USC §1983 claim against Defendants Mathis and Wright must be determined with 
the receipt of evidence. From the fourth cause of action, the zoning estoppel claim based on 
representations made by Defendants Mathis and Wright as to property purchasers' ability to get a 
building permit cannot be resolved without evidence. From the sixth cause of action, the issue of 
whether Ordinance 97-13 lasted longer than six months in violation of U.C.A. §17-27-404, 
resulting in some harm to the Plaintiffs will require evidence. Finally, from the fourteenth cause of 
action, whether punitive damages are appropriate against Defendants Mathis and Wright must 
also be determined following the receipt of evidence. All other causes of action are resolved by 
summary judgment as noted above. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to prepare an 
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Mr. Arden A. Engebretsen December 16, 1994 
New Canyon Meadows, L. C. 
4815 West Country Club Dive 
Highland, Utah 84003 
Dear Arden: 
Thank you for your letter of December 12, 1994, and its enclosure from Agra 
Earth & Environmental with regard to the stability of the Canyon Meadows site. 
I have tried to take an impartial stance on the matter of the larger Canyon 
Meadows slide. However, at the time a new project is submitted for review, we 
will expect you to submit a geologic study which discloses any hazards in the 
area which will include landsliding. At that time, we will allow you to use this 
study and other evidence to deal with the issues raised by the UDOT letter. 
Until then I won't ask for any more studies unless UDOT or some other body 
informs me of a hazard of which we are not now aware. 
It is difficult for me to say what I have witnessed down there since I have not 
made a detailed physical examination of either the foundation, the roads, or any 
other of the improvements on the site to know whether or not they exist. I am, 
however, willing to agree that I know of no such damage at the present time. 
Sincerely yours, 
Robert A. Mathis, AICP wa 
Wasatch County Planner 
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PLAINTIFFS DISCOVERY RESPONSE FROM 1998 
IDENTIFYING HOMEOWNER PLAINTIFFS 
KURT JOHNSON 
NICK ITRI 
CLARK BISHOP 
ELLA WILLIAMS 
BRADLEY CLEMENTS 
STEVEN HALLADAY 
AL FINCH 
BLAIN CUTLER 
RUSSELL BEAUPRE 
WILLIAM ELLINGSON 
GEORGE GOURLEY 
MORRIS GARDNER 
NORMAN ROLLINGSON 
M. DOUGLAS MOORE 
FERNANDO SILVA 
GLEN JOHNSON 
DOUG ALLINGER 
INTERROGATORY NO. 56: State the purchase price of each of 
plaintiffs' lots and the cost of improvements thereon. 
RESPONSE 
Property Owner Purchase Price and improvements 
JOHN GARDNER Al unimproved lot 
Jll $200,000 Condo 
J12 $200,000 Condo 
12 
A 
A 
A 
A 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
G 
24 
45 
46 
15 
1 
2 
4 
10 
11 
14 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
1 
KURT JOHNSON 
(a)December 199 6 
(b)Residential 
(c)Pending 
ELLA WILLIAMS 
(a)January 1996 
(b)Residential 
(c)Wasatch County refused to accept the application. 
INTERROGATORY No. 55: With respect to Allegation No. 14 
your complaint, please identify, "plaintiffs homeowners 1-2 9" 
name and identify which lots within Canyon Meadows they own. 
RESPONSE. Property Owner Plat Lot 
SCOTT DIXON A 2 
HANS ZIMMER A 4 
ROBERT BORLICK A 5 
KENNETH WALTERS A 7 
DENNIS HOLLAND A 9 
KENNETH HAMBILN A 10 
DEBRA RICHMAN A 12 
MARGARET KALISZEWSKA A 13 
RAY HARPER A 14 
BRYAN SMITH A 18 
NEDRA SENGLEMEN A 19 
DIANA PETERSON A 2 0, 21, 
B 5, 6, 7, 8 
11 
SCOTT DIXON 
CLARK JOHNSON 
HANS ZIMMER 
ROBERT BORLICK 
ROBERT PEREZ 
KENNETH WALTERS 
HOWARD VAN FLEET 
DENNIS HOLLAND 
KENNETH HAMBILN 
VICTOR ORVIS 
DEBRA RICHMAN 
MARGARET KALISZEWSKA 
RAY HARPER 
CHARLES TIETGEN 
BRYAN SMITH 
NEDRA SENGLEMEN 
HUGH ALLRED 
DIANA PETERSON 
Currently unknown 
$55,000 
$41,000 
$425,000 home sold 
for $325,000 
Unimproved lot 
$27,000 to $38,000 
Unimproved lot 
$56,500 Home under 
construction 
Currently unknown 
$230,000 Cabin 
Currently unknown 
$25,000 Unimproved lot 
$32,000 Unimproved lot 
$335,000 Home 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
$62-65,0 00 Unimproved lot 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
$64,900 
A20 $? 
A21 $55,000 
B5 $51,205 
B6 $51,205 
B7 $51,965 
B8 $53,105 
$236,000 Home 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
KURT JOHNSON $71,000 Unimproved lot 
13 
NICK ITRI 
CLARK BISHOP 
BRIAN BROTHERS 
HELEN VAN ORMEN 
ELLA WILLIAMS 
BRADLEY CLEMENTS 
STEVEN HALLADAY 
AL FINCH 
BLAKE RONEY 
BLAIN CUTLER 
RUSSELL BEAUPRE 
VALARIE BUSS10 
WILLIAM ELLINGSON 
DEE OLSEN 
STEVE HIRSCHFIELD 
GEORGE GOURLEY 
MORRIS GARDNER 
NORMAN ROLLINGSON 
M. DOUGLAS MOORE 
FERNANDO SILVA 
GLEN JOHNSON 
DOUG ALLINGER 
$55,000 
$87,000 
$30,000 
$78,000 
$65,000 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
$375,000 Home 
$225,000 Home 
Unimproved lot 
Unimproved lot 
Currently unknown 
$3 0,000 Unimproved lot 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
$79,900 Unimproved lot 
$100,000 Unimproved lot 
Currently unknown 
$51,000 $525,000 Home 
$79,900 $890,000 Home 
Currently unknown 
$25,000 $525,000 Home 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
Currently unknown 
$225,000 Condo 
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Dated December 1998 
Victor Orvis 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Utah ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by 
VICTOR ORVIS on DECEMBER I , 1998, 
7) /£^3&\ NOTARY PUBUi 
i$2^ PETRfTA FIERRO HDSouthMmn 
Pimmr 6nwt. UT 84062 
My Commtufcm Expwtc 11-1&2001 
SmtBOf Utah 
iSSSSS 
Notary Public 
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